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Surprisingly little is known about the pattern of index option returns, even though call and put 
options on the S&P 500 index have high volume of trade on the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange since April 1986, are liquid, and the panel data on their transaction or closing prices is 
readily available.  Contrary to the predictions of the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973a) (hereafter “BSM”) model, we find that, over the period 1986-2009, the leverage-
adjusted average returns on index calls are too low and put returns are too high relative to the 
average returns on the index; and the leverage-adjusted average returns on index call and put 
options are decreasing in their strike-to-price ratio. 
A potential explanation of these results is that one or more priced factors are missing, 
such as stochastic volatility and jump risk which are omitted in the BSM model or factors such 
as value and size which have traditionally been applied to explain the cross-section of equity 
returns.  We test a large number of plausible unconditional factor models, where the factor 
premia are estimated either from the universe of equities or the universe of options. 
The first challenge is to find a factor and its associated premium, estimated from the 
universe of index options, (along with the market factor and the equity market premium) which 
explains, at least in part, the level and slope (that is, the variation across moneyness) of index 
option returns.  We find that several factors yield betas which are essentially random across 
moneyness and fail to address the level and slope of option returns. 
A second group of factors yield betas which are monotone across moneyness and these 
factors explain, at least in part, the slope but not the level of index option returns.  We view these 
results with caution because they are mechanically attainable with any factor with monotone 
betas across moneyness, given that there are only two sizeable principal components in the 
covariance structure of the index option portfolios, accounting for 89% and 10% of the variance, 
respectively. 
A third group of factors yield betas which are monotone across moneyness and these 
factors explain, at least in part, both the level and slope of index option returns.  For these 
factors, we compare the factor premium estimated from the universe of options and the premium 
estimated from the universe of equities.  For some factors, the two premia are statistically 
different and it would be difficult to reconcile a pricing theory based on these factors with the 
notion that the equities and index options markets are integrated.  For some other factors, 
however, the premium estimated from the universe of index options is not statistically different 2 
 
from the premium estimated from the universe of equities.  These factors are candidates to 
address the second and bigger challenge. 
The second challenge is to find a factor and its associated premium estimated from the 
universe of equities (along with the market factor and the equity premium) which explains, at 
least in part, both the level and slope of index option returns.
1  Of all the factors that we consider, 
three crisis-related factors that capture jumps in market volatility (Volatility Jump), jumps in the 
market index (Jump), and changes in liquidity (Liquidity) are the only ones that meet this 
challenge: they work reasonably well in explaining the cross-section of index option returns, 
even when we impose the restriction that the premia are estimated from the universe of equities.  
In particular, Volatility Jump has a large and significant premium among equities and is able to 
reduce the pricing errors of our option portfolio by 75%.  It also reduces the pricing errors of the 
Fama-French portfolio by more than the Size factor and only a bit less than the Value factor.  
These findings are consistent with the picture that crisis-related factors operate across the 
equities and index options markets. 
Theoretical motivation for Volatility Jump is provided in Ghosh and Constantinides 
(2011).  In a two-regime equilibrium model, volatility shocks in the consumption and dividend 
growth processes induce jumps in the volatility of the market return.  The model partly explains 
the cross-section of equity returns and sheds light on the predictability of the market return and 
the consumption and dividend growth. 
A cross-section of index option returns of different moneyness presents a novel set of 
technical problems.  The first is to obtain statistically significant variation in the cross-section of 
returns because, as Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2009) demonstrated, data errors and 
transaction costs may lead to the conclusion that even naïve models can be consistent with the 
data.  We address this issue by using portfolios of options with different moneyness as opposed 
to individual options.  The second problem is to generate portfolio returns which are stationary 
and not overly skewed.  We address this issue by revising the portfolios daily in a way that the 
moneyness, maturity, and leverage of each portfolio remain fairly constant.
2  This portfolio 
technique reduces variability sufficiently to meaningfully conduct the tests and may explain why 
our results differ from earlier results.  The third technical problem stems from the occasional lack 
                                                 
1 This approach is in the spirit of the recommendation in Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) to expand the set of 
test assets to include other portfolios. 
2 See Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001) for an early construction of portfolios addressing the first two challenges. 3 
 
of price quotes when we wish to trade out of an options position which may lead to survivorship 
bias, look-ahead bias, and the revision of the portfolios at artificial prices.  We address these 
problems and also demonstrate that our results are highly insensitive to the method of portfolio 
revision. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section I, we provide the theoretical motivation for 
our empirical investigation.  We review the literature in Section II.  In Section III, we describe 
the data sets, filters, and the formation of portfolios of options.  In Section IV, we present our 
empirical results of tests of the BSM model.  The empirical results of tests of factor pricing 




I.  Theoretical Motivation 
 
The leverage-adjusted instantaneous rate of return on an option is defined as the instantaneous 
rate of return on a portfolio of the option and the risk free rate, where the weight of the option in 
the portfolio equals the inverse of the elasticity of the option price with respect to the price of the 
underlying security.  The BSM option pricing model implies the following result which we state 
as a testable hypothesis: 
 
0 H : The instantaneous expected rate of return of a leverage-adjusted option equals the 
instantaneous rate of return of the underlying security and is independent of the option 
moneyness. 
 
Specifically, let S be the price of the underlying security with dynamics
( ) /
S
SS dS S dt dB t μσ =+ , where  ( ) , σσ ≡ SS St  is the volatility of the underlying security and 4 
 
()
S B t  is a one-dimensional Brownian motion.
3  Absence of arbitrage implies that the option price, 
() , HS t, satisfies the partial differential equation 
 
()
22 /2 t SS S S H rS H S H r H δ σ +− + =      (1) 
 
where  ( ) , ≡ rr S t  is the instantaneous risk free rate and  ( ) , St δδ ≡  is the dividend yield.  The 
option elasticity or “beta” with respect to the underlying security is defined as  / ω ≡ S SH H .  
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and equals the instantaneous expected rate of return of the underlying security, independent of 
the option moneyness and of any other characteristics of the option.  In this paper, we test and 
reject this hypothesis. 
Rearranging equation (2), we obtain that the leverage-unadjusted instantaneous expected 








μ δω ⎡⎤ =+ +− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
     (3) 
 
                                                 
3 We refer to the one-dimensional diffusion process with  ( ) , SS St σσ ≡  as the BSM model.  Bergman, Grundy, and 
Wiener (1996) study properties of option prices under this process. 5 
 
and equals the risk free rate plus a premium for the risk of the underlying security.  This 
premium is the product of the risk premium of the underlying security,  S r μ δ + − , and the option 
beta with respect to the underlying security,  / S SH H ω ≡ . 
Under the assumptions of the BSM model, the elasticity of a European call and of a 
European put is increasing in the strike.  Equation (3) implies the following result which we state 
as a testable hypothesis: 
 
0
unadjusted H : The instantaneous expected rate of return of a leverage-unadjusted European call or 
put option is increasing in the strike, if the risk premium on the underlying security is positive. 
 
The hypothesis  0
unadjusted H  is weaker than the hypothesis  0 H  (and equation (3)) because 
the hypothesis  0
unadjusted H  does not specify by how much the instantaneous expected rate of return 
of a leverage-unadjusted European call or put option is increasing in the strike, even though 
equation (3) spells out that the expected rate of return is increasing in the strike as () . S r μ δω +−   
Thus, it is possible to reject  0 H  but fail to reject  0
unadjusted H .  In this paper, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis  0
unadjusted H . 
Our rejection of the BSM model through rejection of the hypothesis  0 H  motivates our 
tests of Merton’s (1973b) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM): 
 
ICAPM H  : The instantaneous expected rate of return of a security equals the risk free rate plus a 
sum of premia; each premium is the product of the risk premium of a factor and the security beta 
with respect to that factor. 
 
The ICAPM specifies neither the number nor the identity of the factors.  In each of our 
main tests of the ICAPM, we limit the number of factors to two because the cross-section of test 
assets is small, consisting of only ten portfolios of index options.  The first factor is always the 
market index S with risk premium  S r μ δ + − .  For the second factor x with risk premium λ , we 6 
 
report results for a wide range of candidate factors.  Below, we illustrate the hypothesis  ICAPM H  
in this special case. 
The option price,  ( ) ,, HSx t, is a function of ( ) ,, Sxt.  The option beta with respect to 
the market index is  / S SH H  and with respect to x is  / x SH H .  The (leverage-unadjusted) 







dt H H H
μδ λ ⎡⎤ =+ +− + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
     (4) 
 
In the special case of the BSM model, the option price is a function of ( ) , St  but not of x 
and equation (4) reduces to equation (3).  Therefore,  ICAPM H  nests  0 H .  Furthermore,  ICAPM H  
nests  0
unadjusted H  because equation (3) implies  0
unadjusted H . 
In our empirical investigation of the hypothesis  ICAPM H , we construct leverage-adjusted 
portfolios of options because their return distribution is closer to normal than the returns of 
leverage-unadjusted portfolios of options.  In constructing a leverage-adjusted portfolio, we 
approximate the elasticity with respect to the index by  BSM ω , the elasticity implied by the BSM 
model, without asserting that  BSM ω  equals the true elasticity with respect to the index,  / x SH H .  
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1 / sB S M S SH H βω
− ≡  is the beta of the leverage-adjusted portfolio return with respect to the 
market index and 
1 / xB S M x SH H βω
− ≡  is the beta of the leverage-adjusted portfolio return with 
respect to the factor x.   We test the hypothesis  ICAPM H  by testing equation (5) for a large number 
of candidate factors x.  We discuss the empirical results in Section V. 
Note that the derivation of equation (5) does not require that  BSM ω  equal the true elasticity 
with respect to the market index,  / S SH H .  However, the estimated value of the market beta is 
close to one, suggesting that the true elasticity,  / S SH H , is well approximated by the BSM 
elasticity,  BSM ω . 
 
 
II.  Review of the Literature 
 
The first line of index options research addresses the predictions of the BSM model.  Rubinstein 
(1985) rejected the prediction that the implied volatility of individual stock options is constant 
across strikes and Rubinstein (1994) rejected the corresponding prediction for index options.  An 
equivalent prediction is that the risk-neutral stock price distribution is lognormal.  Jackwerth and 
Rubinstein (1996) confirmed that, prior to the October 1987 crash, the risk-neutral stock price 
distribution implied by option prices is close to lognormal, consistent with a moderate implied 
volatility smile.  Thereafter, the distribution is systematically left-skewed and leptokurtic, 
consistent with a more pronounced skew in implied volatilities.
4 
Rubinstein (1994) extended the complete-market no-arbitrage model by modeling 
volatility as a deterministic function of the price,  ( ) , St σσ = .  Dumas, Fleming, and Whaley 
(1998) rejected this model, pointing out that deterministic volatility models do not predict option 
prices well and that the parameters change widely across time. 
Our first two tests fall under this line of research.  Specifically, we reject the hypothesis 
0 H  that leverage-adjusted option returns are independent of moneyness on S&P 500 index put 
portfolio returns.  We also reject the hypothesis on S&P 500 index call portfolio returns for the 
                                                 
4 A number of methods for estimating the risk-neutral stock price distribution from the cross section of option prices 
exist, e.g. Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998).  Jackwerth (2004) reviewed the parametric and non-parametric methods for 
estimating the risk-neutral distribution. 8 
 
subperiod 1986-1995 (Berkeley database) and marginally so for the period 1996-2009 
(OptionMetrics database). 
The second line of index options research eliminates the assumption of the BSM model 
that the underlying security price (in our case, the index price) is a geometric Brownian motion.  
The market is no longer complete and an index option cannot be priced relative to the index price 
by the no-arbitrage argument.  In this line of index options research, the stochastic discount 
factor is assumed to be a (possibly non-linear) function of just one state variable, the market.  
Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000), and Rosenberg and Engle (2002) estimated the 
stochastic discount factor implied by the observed cross section of prices of S&P 500 index 
options as a function of wealth, where wealth is proxied by the S&P 500 index level.  Jackwerth 
(2000) reported that the stochastic discount factor is everywhere decreasing during the pre-crash 
period 1986-1987, but widespread violations occur over the post-crash period 1987-1995.  Ait-
Sahalia and Lo (2000) and Rosenberg and Engle (2002) reported violations as well.  Thus, we 
are faced with an empirical stochastic discount factor puzzle that has been corroborated for other 
countries in Shive and Shumway (2004). 
In the same line of research, Constantinides, Jackwerth, and Perrakis (2009) found that 
S&P 500 index options are often overpriced and these options may be incorporated in portfolios 
that stochastically dominate portfolios that do not include them.  Constantinides, Czerwonko, 
Jackwerth, and Perrakis (2011) corroborated this evidence on S&P 500 index futures options and 
provided out-of-sample empirical evidence that portfolios which incorporate such overpriced 
options stochastically dominate portfolios that do not include them.  They rejected the hypothesis 
that the observed cross-sections of one-month S&P 500 index futures option prices are consistent 
with various economic models that explicitly allow for a dynamically incomplete market and 
also an imperfect market that recognizes trading costs and bid-ask spreads in the context of a 
one-factor model which is not necessarily linear. 
Along this line of research, we consider a stochastic discount factor which is a linear in 
the market return (the CAPM).  We also consider a stochastic discount factor linear in the market 
return and realized volatility, effectively a quadratic function of the market return.  We find that 
this stochastic discount factor does not explain the cross-section of option returns. 
The third line of research recognizes that there may be priced factors over and above the 
market.  Many of these models are critically discussed in Hull (2011), Jackwerth (2004), 9 
 
McDonald (2006), and Singleton (2006).  Historically, the literature evolved via the stochastic 
jump model of Merton (1976) and the stochastic volatility model of Heston (1993) into the 
modern stochastic volatility models of Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000), Christoffersen, 
Heston, and Jacobs (2010), and Jones (2006); and the combined stochastic volatility-stochastic 
jump models of Bates (1996) and Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) and models with jumps in both the 
price and volatility such as Eraker, Johannes, and Polson (2003) and Duffie, Pan, and Singleton 
(2000). Our main tests fall under this line of research. 
Beyond stochastic volatility and jumps, a number of authors added other factors.  Chabi-
Yo, Garcia, and Renault (2008) introduced a latent variable upon which states then fundamental 
variables or preferences in turn might depend.  Bates (2008) included the number of stock 
markets crashes as a state variable.  Brennan, Liu, and Xia (2008) introduced the interest rate and 
the maximal Sharpe ratio as additional state variables.  Christoffersen, Heston, and Jacobs (2006) 
added conditional skewness in a GARCH setting while Kozhan, Neuberger, and Schneider 
(2010) directly introduced a skew risk premium.  Other lines of research include buying pressure, 
suggested by Bollen and Whaley (2004), Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009), and 
Naranjo (2009) and behavioral explanations based on sentiment, suggested by Han (2008) and 
Shefrin (2005). Our main tests fall under this line of research also. 
Finally, calibrated equilibrium models can generate the volatility smile pattern observed 
in option prices.  David and Veronesi (2002) modeled the investors’ learning about 
fundamentals, calibrated their model to earnings data, and provided a close fit to the panel of 
prices of S&P 500 options.  Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005) investigated rare-event premia driven by 
uncertainty aversion in the context of a calibrated equilibrium model and demonstrated that the 
model generates volatility smiles similar to those observed in option prices.  Benzoni, Collin-
Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) extended the above approach to show that uncertainty aversion is 
not a necessary ingredient of the model.  Rather, they argued that a jump in dividends is 
unnecessary as long as there can be jumps in expected dividend growth rates.  They also 
demonstrated that the model can generate the stark regime shift that occurred at the time of the 
1987 crash.  Drechsler and Yaron (2008) and Shaliastovitch (2008) generated the smile observed 
in the implied volatilities by modeling jumps in consumption growth. 
Coval and Shumway (2001) also investigated index option returns and found option 
returns increasing in strike prices.  Bakshi, Madan, and Panayotov (2010) found just the opposite 10 
 
based on 28 day holding returns for SPX options, albeit with such large standard errors as to 
leave all returns insignificantly different from zero.  Given negative returns on zero beta 
straddles, they argue that additional factors must exist, a claim shared by Buraschi and Jackwerth 
(2001).  However, neither paper went on to identify the missing factor(s), a task which our paper 
takes on.  Coval and Shumway’s (2001) sample covers the period 1990-1995 and uses weekly 
holding period returns in the OEX and SPX markets for options written on the S&P 100 and 
S&P 500, respectively.  Their weekly standard deviations of near-the-money SPX options is 
around 3% and thus about 10 times larger than our monthly standard deviation of about 0.28%.  
Working with straddles, Coval and Shumway (2001) reduced their standard deviation to about 
1% which is still more than three times as large as our values. 
All of the previously-cited research was done on index options or index futures options.  
For related research on individual stock options see Chaudhuri and Schroder (2009), 
Christoffersen, Goyenko, Jacobs, and Karoui (2011), Duarte and Jones (2007), Şerban, 
Lehoczky, and Seppi (2008), and Ni (2007). 
 
 
III.  Data Sets, Filters, and Portfolio Formation 
 
We construct the return series of ten portfolios of S&P 500 European style options (SPX).  Each 
portfolio is made up of either calls or puts with five targeted moneyness ratios, K/S = 0.95, 0.98, 
1, 1.02, and 1.05.  Our data starts in April 1986 and ends in October 2009.  We carry out our 
main tests over this time period.  We verify the robustness of our results by also analyzing the 
subsample that excludes the destabilizing effect of the 1987 crash.  Appendix A provides 
technical details on the data sets, filters, and portfolio formation. 
 
III.1 Data  sets 
The master Berkeley Options Database contains intraday quotes on individual SPX options from 
April 2, 1986 through December 31, 1995.  To be consistent with the OptionMetrics database 
which reports only closing prices, we extract from the master Berkeley Options Database a 
subsample of closing prices from April 2, 1986 through December 31, 1995 and refer to it as the 
“Berkeley database”.  In Appendix A.1, we describe the construction of the Berkeley database. 11 
 
The OptionMetrics database contains end-of-day quotes from January 4, 1996 to October 
31, 2009.  The end-of-day quotes are collected using a proprietary method similar to the one we 
outlined for the Berkeley database.  OptionMetrics provides the dividend yield and open interest 
of each option contract, and we collect that as well. 
The bid-ask spreads of calls and puts, as a percentage of the average bid and ask prices, 
are generally similar for the Berkeley and OptionMetrics data sets.  The spreads for ATM and 
ITM options are about 5%.  The percentage spreads for OTM options are typically two to three 
times higher, reflecting the reluctance of CBOE members to make markets in these options and 
the higher value of these options.  The spreads are further discussed in Appendix A.1. 
 
III.2 Filters 
We sift the option prices through several filters to ensure that only options with reliable quotes 
enter our portfolios.  The filtered data consist of 83,630 observations from the Berkeley database 
(42% calls) and 379,272 observations from OptionMetrics (44% calls).  The filters are described 
in Appendix A.2. 
 
III.3 Portfolio  formation 
We use the filtered data to form portfolios and calculate their returns.  We trade in and out of 
portfolios daily to obtain monthly returns.  We construct 10 portfolios, five made up of calls and 
five made up of puts, each with a target maturity 45 days and moneyness in the discrete set 0.95, 
0.98, 1.00, 1.02, and 1.05.  We buy and sell options at their bid-ask midpoints.
5  We select which 
options go into each portfolio every day through a bivariate Gaussian kernel procedure with 
weights centered on the target maturity and moneyness, as explained in Appendix A.3. 
We revise each portfolio daily.  If a held option has a quote in the filtered data, we use 
this quote as the trade-out price; if it does not have a quote in the filtered data but has a quote in 
the unfiltered data, we use this quote as the trade-out price.  If the option does not have a quote in 
the unfiltered data, we hold it until it reappears or, if necessary, until the end of the month at 
                                                 
5 One may argue that transaction costs derail our rebalancing which is now carried out at the bid-ask midpoints.  
Note, however, that market makers are actually buying closer to the bid prices and selling closer to the ask prices.  
Such market makers would be able to trade close to what we describe in terms of rebalanced portfolios at midpoints.  
In any case, we motivate portfolio rebalancing as a statistical procedure for obtaining monthly portfolio returns with 
distribution close to normal rather than an implementable trading strategy. 12 
 
which point we interpolate its price, as explained in Appendix A.3.  When holding on to a 
missing option, we keep it on the books at the purchase price and rescale its weight, dividing it 
by the daily portfolio return to fix the original dollar investment in the option.  When the option 
reappears, its new price reflects the cumulative return on the option throughout its time in the 
portfolio.
6 
Statistics on missing options are displayed in Table I.  The problem of missing options is 
concentrated in the Berkeley database, where 14% of calls and 15% of puts go missing on the 
following trading day.  While many of these options reappear before the end of the month, the 
process of carrying missing options on the books leads to more missing options at the end of the 
month than at the beginning.  These two effects offset each other so that at the end of the month 
in the Berkeley database, 15% of calls and 16% of puts are interpolated based on a fitted implied 
volatility curve.  By contrast, in OptionMetrics, only 30 out of 132,624 observations ever go 
missing. 
 
[Table I about here] 
 
We test the hypothesis  0 H  on monthly rates of return of leverage-adjusted portfolios 
constructed as follows.  First, we calculate the daily return of each leverage-adjusted option as 
the daily return on a portfolio consisting of 
1
BSM ω
−  dollars invested in the option and 
1 1 BSM ω
− −  
dollars in the risk free rate, where  BSM ω  is the BSM elasticity based on the implied volatility of 
the option.  Second, we combine the leverage-adjusted daily option returns into daily portfolio 
returns using the weights obtained with the bivariate Gaussian kernel procedure described 
earlier.  Third, we multiply the daily portfolio returns within each month to obtain the 
compounded monthly portfolio returns.  Finally, we convert the monthly portfolio returns into 
percentage monthly rates of return.  Later on, we test the hypothesis  ICAPM H  on monthly excess 
returns which we construct by subtracting from the monthly returns the monthly return on 1-
month T-Bills obtained from CRSP. 
                                                 
6 For example, if we invest 2 cents in a call and the value of our portfolio doubles from $1 to $2 while the call is not 
traded, the weight of the call becomes 0.01.  If the call then comes back and its price too has doubled, its weight is 
appropriately restored to 0.02, giving the correct cumulative portfolio return of 100%.  In this way, we avoid any 
look-ahead bias and minimize the effect of missing options on the monthly portfolio return.  Options that ultimately 
reappear do not introduce an error. 13 
 
The aggregation of options into portfolios, the daily rebalancing of the portfolios and the 
daily adjustment for leverage have the effect of moderating the highly skewed distribution of 
naked options held to maturity.  In Table II, the reported Jarque–Bera statistics, skewness, and 
kurtosis of the leverage-adjusted portfolios indicate that the deviation of the return distributions 
from normality is moderate.  Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2009, Table 2) reported skewness 
4.5 and kurtosis 25.1 for the monthly put returns on a non-rebalanced portfolio.  By contrast, the 
ATM monthly put returns on our daily-rebalanced portfolio exhibit skewness -1.04 and kurtosis 
7.33. 
 
[Table II about here] 
 
The leverage adjustment of the options in our portfolios ensures that these portfolios have 
monthly index betas close to one.  These betas need not exactly equal one for two reasons.  First, 
we leverage-adjust options using the elasticity implied by the BSM model which may not be the 
exact elasticity, if the BSM model is not applicable to these options.  Second, we leverage-adjust 
daily returns which we subsequently compound into monthly returns; this is not the same as 
leverage adjusting monthly returns.  Indeed, the call portfolio monthly betas reported in Table II 
are lower than one and as low as 0.77 while the put portfolio betas range from 0.96 to 1.02.  
These discrepancies are not a cause for concern because in the formal tests of the hypothesis 
ICAPM H  we explicitly adjust for the market beta instead of presuming that it equals one.  In Table 
II, we also report the elasticities of the options before they are adjusted for leverage.  The 
implied volatility skew makes the elasticity range for calls [15.96, 41.74] much wider than the 
elasticity range for puts [-27.96, -18.73].
7 
  
                                                 
7 This pattern is driven by the implied volatility skew.  The skew increases the price of ITM calls (relative to the 
BSM model) and decreases their elasticity, thereby increasing the range of call elasticities.  By contrast, the skew 
increases the price of OTM puts and increases their (negative) elasticity, thereby decreasing the range of put 
elasticities. 14 
 
IV.  Empirical Results for the Black-Scholes-Merton Model 
 
Recall that the BSM model implies the hypothesis  0 H : the instantaneous expected rate of return 
of a leverage-adjusted option equals the rate of return of the underlying security and is 
independent of the option moneyness.  This hypothesis is rejected for the portfolios of put 
options.  In Table II, the portfolio returns are decreasing in the K/S ratio for the full sample and 
for both the Berkeley and OptionMetrics subsamples.  The differences in returns across 
moneyness are economically large.  The monthly return difference between the put portfolios 
with moneyness 1.05 and 0.95 is -91 bps for Berkeley and -58 bps for OptionMetrics.  Both of 
these differences are highly statistically significant. 
In the full sample and in the Berkeley subsample, the call portfolio returns are decreasing 
in the K/S ratio and the difference between the call portfolios with moneyness 1.05 and 0.95 is 
marginally statistically significant in the full sample and strongly significant in the Berkeley 
subsample where we reject the hypothesis  0 H .  In the OptionMetrics subsample, the excess 
returns of the call portfolios are essentially zero, irrespective of moneyness, and we cannot reject 
the hypothesis  0 H . 
However, the hypothesis  0 H  is rejected in the full sample, once we append the S&P 500 
index to the set of call portfolios.  Informally, we may think of the S&P 500 index as a European 
call on the index with zero strike because it has the same price and same rate of return as the 
hypothetical call but for the dividend adjustment.  The average monthly excess return on the 
index in the full sample period 1986-2009 is 85 bps.  By contrast, the average excess return on 
all five call portfolios in the same period is negative, as shown by their negative Sharpe ratios 
reported in Table II.  This difference is economically large.  In Section V.1, Table VIII, we show 
that this difference is statistically significant by showing that the call portfolio returns have 
economically large negative and statistically significant alphas in the context of the capital asset 
pricing model.  Furthermore, the alpha of the OTM put portfolio is large positive and statistically 
significant. 
As a robustness check to our particular method of filtering the data, we remove all data 
filters.  The monthly portfolio returns are displayed in Table III and are virtually identical to the 
results presented in Table II. 15 
 
 
[Table III about here] 
 
Recall that, if a held option does not have a quote at the end of the month either in the 
filtered or the unfiltered data, we set the trade-out price equal to the BSM price with volatility 
obtained from the fitted implied volatility curve.  As a robustness check to this procedure, we 
display the monthly portfolio returns when we subtract (Table IV) or add (Table V) two 
percentage points to the fitted implied volatility in setting the trade-out price.  The monthly 
portfolio returns are virtually identical to the results presented in Table II. 
 
[Table IV and V about here] 
 
As a final robustness check, we exclude from the Berkeley database the destabilizing 
effect of the October 1987 crash, starting the sample in July 1988 instead of April 1986; and we 
exclude the 2007-2009 crisis by ending the sample in June 2007.  The monthly portfolio returns 
are displayed in Table VI and are very similar to those in Table II. 
 
[Table VI about here] 
 
The BSM model also implies the weaker hypothesis  0
unadjusted H : the instantaneous 
expected rate of return of a leverage-unadjusted European call or put option is increasing in the 
strike, if the risk premium on the underlying security is positive.  In Table VII, the reported 
Jarque–Bera statistics, skewness, and kurtosis of the leverage-unadjusted portfolios indicate that 
the return distributions deviate from normality much more than the return distributions of the 
leverage-adjusted portfolios.  Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
 
[Table VII about here] 
 
Unlevered put returns from both databases are increasing in the K/S ratio, thereby not 
rejecting the hypothesis  0
unadjusted H .  Recall that levered put returns from both databases reject the 16 
 
hypothesis  0 H .  These two results are not inconsistent because  0
unadjusted H  is a weaker hypothesis 
than  0 H . 
Unlevered call returns from the Berkeley database are increasing in the K/S ratio, thereby 
not rejecting the hypothesis  0
unadjusted H , consistent with earlier results on call returns over the 
same time period by Coval and Shumway (2001).  Recall that levered call returns from the 
Berkeley database reject the hypothesis  0 H .  Unlevered call returns from OptionMetrics are 
decreasing in the K/S ratio but this decrease is not statistically significant. 
 
 
V.  Empirical Results for Factor Models 
 
We seek to explain the returns of the cross-section of option portfolios with unconditional factor 
pricing models, that is, under the maintained hypothesis that the factor premia and the factor 
betas are constant over the sample period from April 1986 until October 2009.  In Section V.7, 
we find that the results are robust in subperiods and conclude that the maintained hypothesis is 
not critical. 
The risk factors are suggested by either the equities, or the options literatures, or both.  
Throughout, the term “factors” refers to “monthly factor innovations”.  Appendix B provides a 
listing of the factors and their descriptions.  The cross-section of option portfolios consists of 5 
call and 5 put portfolios.  There are only two sizeable principal components in the covariance 
structure of the option portfolios, accounting for 89% and 10% of the variance, respectively.  
This feature of the covariance structure guides our test design.  We limit the pricing model to at 
most two factors at a time, with the market proxied by the S&P 500 index being always the first 
factor and at times being the sole factor.  Thus with each model we test one new factor at a time. 
We first estimate the factor premia from the cross-section of equity returns, where we use 
the standard Fama-French 25 portfolios, and test whether these premia explain the cross-section 
of option returns.
8  We then apply a lower hurdle for the model by estimating the factor premia 
                                                 
8 In the robustness Section V.7, we report results using an alternative set of equity portfolios.  Specifically, we 
construct a set of equity decile portfolios for each factor by sorting stocks according to their factor loadings.  The 
results remain essentially unchanged. 17 
 
from the cross-section of option returns and testing whether these premia explain the cross-
section of option returns. 
Our leverage-adjusted option portfolios with daily rebalancing have portfolio returns 
closer to normal than is common in the option pricing literature.  For this reason, we are 
comfortable with a linear pricing test.  However, we also consider non-linear pricing tests with 
return jumps and volatility as factors.  Our approach consists of several stages and may 
potentially introduce unaccounted errors-in-the-variables.  We deal with this issue by running all 
stages simultaneously in one GMM criterion, as suggested by Cochrane (2005).  We also report 
bootstrapped standard errors.  The methodology is described in Appendix C. 
In Section V.1, we test the hypothesis that the CAPM prices the cross-section of index 
option returns, where the market return is proxied by either the return on the S&P 500 index or 
the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index.  In Section V.2, we introduce factors that 
have been shown to price equities, specifically, Size, Value, and Momentum.  In Section V.3, we 
consider six volatility-related factors: Jump, Volatility (implied volatility), Volatility Jump, RV 
(realized volatility), IV-RV (implied-minus-realized volatility), and Slope.  In Section V.4, we 
examine factors that address the liquidity of the options market: Liquidity (the Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor), Volume (trading volume), Open Interest, OTM Put Volume, 
and Bid-Ask (bid-ask spread).  In Section V.5, we explore factors that reflect sentiment: 
Sentiment (the Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment factor) and SPF Dispersion (forecast 
dispersion from the Survey of Professional Forecasts); and factors that reflect noise-trader 
beliefs, as captured by Retail Call Demand and Retail Put Demand.  Finally, we examine the 
macro factors Default (default premium), Term (term premium), Sharpe (market Sharpe ratio), 
Riskfree (risk free rate), Inflation, and GDP. 
 
V.1  The capital asset pricing model 
The hypothesis that the unconditional CAPM prices the cross-section of index option returns at 
the monthly frequency relaxes the maintained hypothesis of the BSM model that the market is 
complete.  In the first column of Table VIII, we display the market betas of the index options, 
where the market return is proxied by the return on the S&P 500 index.
9  The betas are close to 
                                                 
9 In this and the following tables, we do not display the betas and pricing errors of portfolios with K/S ratio 0.98 and 
1.02 because this information may be largely inferred from the statistics of the portfolios with adjacent moneyness. 18 
 
one, ranging between 0.77 and 1.02.  This is not surprising, given that the option portfolios are 
leverage-adjusted with the goal to make the market beta of each portfolio close to one.  First, we 
estimate the premium on the universe of equities.  The price of market risk (58 bps) is close to 
the average market premium, which is 54 bps per month in our sample.  In the same column, we 
display the pricing error (alpha) for each option portfolio.  The hypothesis that the alphas are 
jointly zero is rejected with p-value zero. 
 
[Table VIII about here] 
 
The alphas of the call portfolios are negative and statistically significant.  These negative 
alphas are also economically significant: at about -60 bps per month, they are much bigger than 
the actual return on any of our call portfolios (17 to 32 bps).  Therefore, index calls are expensive 
based on the S&P 500 single-factor model.  This conclusion is consistent with our finding in the 
last section that the average excess return on all five call portfolios in the same period is 
negative, as shown by their negative Sharpe ratios reported in Table II. 
The alpha of the OTM puts is large, positive, and statistically significant.  The alphas of 
the other put portfolios are small positive or small negative.  Recall that puts are held short in 
these portfolios because their BSM elasticity is negative.  Therefore, the OTM index puts are 
expensive based on the S&P 500 single-factor model.  This conclusion is consistent with our 
finding in Table II that our put portfolios have returns of the order of 100 bps per month even 
though they have betas close to one and the S&P premium is only half that.  In addition, the large 
negative alpha of -69 bps for the ITM-OTM long-short put portfolio strategy is consistent with 
our earlier finding of a -72 bps spread between these portfolios in the raw leverage-adjusted 
returns in Table II. 
Next we provide a lower hurdle for the model by choosing the equity premium that best 
fits the universe of index options.  The monthly premium on the index return is 36 bps, in 
contrast to the premium estimated on the universe of equities which is 58 bps.  As expected, the 
pricing errors are overall smaller as judged by the root mean squared (rms) error which decreases 
from 47 bps to 42 bps.  However, the improvement in fit is not uniform and the alpha of the 
OTM puts is now higher and more robustly statistically significant.  As before, the hypothesis 
that these alphas are jointly zero is rejected with p-value zero.  There is a fundamental tension 19 
 
between our call portfolios which have low returns and therefore require a lower market 
premium, and our high put portfolio returns, which demand a high market premium.  Allowing a 
free market premium cannot resolve this tension. 
The above results are robust to a number of different treatments.  They are robust to the 
replacement of the S&P 500 index return with the CRSP value-weighted market return as proxy 
for the market.  Therefore, we use in all the two-factor models the S&P 500 index return as 
proxy for the market return.  They are also robust to the post-1996 (OptionMetrics) subperiod, as 
discussed in the robustness Section V.7.  The overall conclusion is that the unconditional CAPM 
does not explain the cross-section of option returns even though it relaxes the maintained 
hypothesis of the BSM model that the market is complete. 
 
V.2  Pricing with equity-based factors 
We study three equity-based factors, defined in Appendix B: the monthly return on the Fama and 
French size factor, “Size”; the monthly return on the Fama and French value factor, “Value”; and 
the momentum factor, the excess return on a portfolio long stocks with high returns over the 
period from 12 to two months before portfolio formation and short stocks with low returns over 
the same period, “Momentum”.  We pair each factor with the S&P 500 index as the first factor.  
The findings are reported in Table VIII. 
The Size betas are negative and statistically significant for calls and positive and 
statistically significant for puts.  The monthly premium on Size estimated from the universe of 
equities is small (-9 bps) and imprecisely estimated over this time period.  As to be expected, the 
alphas and rms error are essentially the same as in the CAPM studied earlier.  The hypothesis 
that the alphas are jointly zero is rejected with p-value zero. 
The premium on Size estimated from the universe of options is larger than the premium 
estimated from the universe of equities by a factor of 36 and has opposite sign.  The model is still 
formally rejected with p-value zero but the pricing errors are smaller and the rms error drops 
from 51 bps to 10 bps.  The option-estimated monthly premium of 327 bps is economically 
implausible, especially contrasted with the sample average return of the Size portfolio, which is 8 
bps per month.  We attribute these results, in part, to the negative correlation of Size with market 
volatility: the correlation of Size with ATM implied volatility (Volatility) is -0.17 and with 
realized volatility (RV) is -0.28.  The negative volatility premium and positive volatility betas of 20 
 
the option portfolios that we report in the next section correspond to the positive Size premium 
and negative Size betas.  Furthermore, the Size premium may be implausibly high because the 
size factor is a noisy proxy for volatility. 
The betas on Value are small and not statistically different from zero.  As a result, the 
alphas are as in the one factor model and the p-value is again zero.  When the Value premium is 
estimated from the universe of options, the point estimate is -5,151 bps per month with standard 
error 779 bps.  Even though the rms error is 37 bps and the p-value is 96%, we dismiss the model 
because the required Value premium makes no economic sense when compared to a portfolio 
return of 31 bps on the value portfolio. 
None of the betas on Momentum are statistically significant.  When the Momentum 
premium is estimated from the universe of equities, the alphas and rms error are comparable to 
those for the CAPM and the p-value is zero.  The momentum premium estimated from the 
universe of options is more than 26 times larger than the premium estimated from the universe of 
equities and has opposite sign.  Even though the rms error is 39 bps and the p-value is 90%, we 
dismiss the model because the required momentum premium makes no economic sense when 
compared to a portfolio return of 57 bps on the momentum portfolio. 
The overall conclusion is that the equity-based factors, Size, Value, and Momentum, do 
not explain the cross-section of option returns in an unconditional factor pricing model even 
though they play a major role in explaining the cross-section of equity returns.  At best, the size 
factor partly proxies for the implied and realized market volatility.  For each of these three 
factors, the equity-based premium is economically and statistically different from the options-
based premium. 
 
V.3  Pricing with volatility-related factors 
We consider six volatility-related factors defined in Appendix B.  In addition to being ubiquitous 
amongst practitioners and researchers on options, some of these factors may proxy for a factor 
which is a non-linear function of the market return.  The factors are: the lowest daily return of 
the S&P 500 during the month, if lower than -4%, zero otherwise, “Jump”; the end-of-the-month 
ATM call portfolio implied volatility minus the beginning-of-the-month ATM call portfolio 
implied volatility, “Volatility”; the highest daily increase of the ATM call portfolio implied 
volatility during the month, if greater than 4%, zero otherwise, “Volatility Jump”; the annualized 21 
 
realized daily volatility over the month minus the realized volatility over the previous month, 
“RV”; the change over last month in the difference between the annualized realized volatility 
during the month and the annualized monthly ATM implied volatility at the beginning of the 
month, “RV-IV”; and the change over last month in the difference between the average of the 
OTM call and ITM put portfolio implied volatility and the average of the ITM call and OTM put 
portfolio implied volatility, “Slope”.  Results with the shorter CBOE-calculated time-series of 
the VIX and SKEW factors are similar to our results for Volatility and Slope, respectively, and 
are not reported here.  We pair each factor with the S&P 500 index as the first factor.  The results 
are reported in Table IX. 
 
[Table IX about here] 
 
Of the six factors, Volatility Jump shows the most promise in explaining the cross-section 
of option returns.  The Volatility Jump premium estimated from the universe of equities is 
negative and significantly different from zero.  The premium estimated from the universe of 
options is also negative and significantly different from zero.  The two premia are of the same 
order of magnitude and are not statistically different from each other.  This is an important 
attribute of a factor that explains the cross-section of returns.  Also note that Volatility Jump 
reduces the pricing errors of the Fama-French portfolio by more than SMB and only a bit less 
than HML.  The Volatility Jump betas of the call portfolios are positive and statistically 
significant; the difference in the betas of the ITM and OTM call portfolios is statistically 
significant.  The Volatility Jump betas of the put portfolios are negative and statistically 
significant; the difference in the betas of the ITM and OTM put portfolios is statistically 
significant.  When the Volatility Jump premium is estimated from the universe of equities, all the 
call and put alphas are statistically insignificant.  The rms error is 13 bps and the p-value is 1%.  
When the premium is estimated from the universe of options, all the call and put alphas, except 
for the alpha of the 5% OTM call portfolio, move closer to zero.  Some are statistically different 
from zero because the standard error shrinks.  The rms error is a miniscule 8 bps and the p-value 
is 2%. 
The Jump betas of the call portfolios are negative and statistically significant.  The Jump 
betas of the put portfolios are not statistically different from zero although the difference in the 22 
 
betas of the ITM and OTM put portfolios is statistically significant.  The Jump premium 
estimated from the universe of equities is positive but not significantly different from zero.  None 
of the call and put alphas is statistically different from zero.  The rms error is 32 bps, compared 
to the rms error of 47 bps obtained from the single-factor model with the S&P 500 index as the 
only factor. Finally, the p-value is 2%.  The Jump premium estimated from the universe of 
options is three times as high but still not significantly different from zero.  It is not statistically 
different from the premium estimated from the universe of equities, suggesting that this factor 
operates across both markets.  None of the call and put alphas is statistically different from zero.  
The rms error is a miniscule 6 bps and the p-value is 15%.  The good performance of Jump 
Volatility and Jump are intimately related as the factors have a correlation coefficient of -0.62. 
The betas of the option portfolios with respect to Volatility are statistically significantly 
different from zero.  The betas of the call portfolios with respect to RV and RV-IV are 
statistically significantly different from zero while not all the betas of the put portfolios with 
respect to this factor are statistically significantly different from zero.  Finally, the Slope betas of 
the option portfolios are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
The premia estimated from the universe of equities are not significantly different from 
zero.  These factors in combination with the S&P 500 index almost always slightly increase the 
alphas and rms errors obtained from the single-factor model with the S&P 500 index as the only 
factor.  The premia estimated from the universe of options are significantly different from zero 
(marginally so for Slope).  The alphas drop dramatically and the rms errors are in the range of 7-
17 bps for all five factors when the premia are estimated from the universe of options.  The 
premia estimated from the universe of options are not statistically different from the premia 
estimated from the universe of equities, except for RV-IV which is marginally significant. 
Whereas these option-based factors are ubiquitous in the option-pricing literature, they 
fail to explain the cross-section of both equity and option returns when their premia are estimated 
from the universe of equities.  Slope presents the most extreme case.  Whereas the point estimate 
of the Slope premium is 84 bps (s.e. 56 bps) when estimated from the universe of equities, the 
estimate is -512 bps (s.e. 303 bps) when estimated from the universe of options.  The rms error 
drops from 53 bps to 17 bps and the p-value climbs from zero to 75%.  The results for Slope 
illustrate the key challenge in fitting our option portfolios: both the level and the spread across 
moneyness in the returns of the option portfolios are out of line with the BSM model.  By design, 23 
 
Slope does a good job in accounting for the spread in returns (notice the small alphas of the long-
short option portfolio strategies,) but it turns out to do poorly on the level of returns, leaving the 
rms alpha relatively high.  Any successful pricing model has to account for both the spread 
across moneyness and the level of option returns. 
The conclusion is that amongst the six volatility-related factors, Volatility Jump and 
Jump are the only two factors that work reasonably well in explaining the cross-section of option 
returns, even when we impose the stricter standard of estimating the premium from the universe 
of equities.  In the next section, we find that Liquidity also works reasonably well in explaining 
the cross-section of option returns and that Volatility Jump and Jump are highly correlated with 
Liquidity with correlation coefficients 0.45 and -0.25, respectively.  Thus a pattern begins to 
emerge that the crisis-related factors, Volatility Jump, Jump, and Liquidity, operate across the 
equities and options markets. 
 
V.4  Pricing with factors that reflect liquidity 
We consider five factors that reflect liquidity, defined in Appendix B: the innovation in market-
wide liquidity proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), measured by the tendency of stocks to 
reverse their returns from one day to the next, “Liquidity”; the percentage change in the total 
monthly option volume, “Volume”; the percentage change in the beginning of month total option 
open interest, “Open Interest”; the percentage change in the monthly 0.95 OTM put option 
volume, “OTM Put Volume”; and the percentage change in the weighted average percentage bid-
ask spread of the ATM call portfolio, “Bid-Ask”.  We pair each factor with the S&P 500 index as 
the first factor.  The results are reported in Table X for the full sample period. 
 
[Table X about here] 
 
A common feature of these factors is that each of them explains the cross-section of 
option returns with very low rms error (7-13 bps) when the premium is estimated from the 
universe of options.  However, with the exception of Liquidity and to a lesser extent Bid-Ask, 
they do not improve upon the single factor model when the premium is estimated from the 
universe of equities. 24 
 
Liquidity shows the most promise in explaining the cross-section of option returns.  Even 
though the Liquidity betas of the call and put portfolios are not statistically different from zero, 
the premium estimated from the universe of equities is positive and significantly different from 
zero.  Almost none of the call and put alphas is statistically different from zero.  The p-value is 
3% and the rms error is 27 bps, compared to the rms error of 47 bps obtained from the single-
factor model with the S&P 500 index as the only factor. 
The Liquidity premium estimated from the universe of options is almost three times as 
high but not significantly different from zero and not significantly different from the premium 
estimated from the universe of equities.  None of the call and put alphas are statistically different 
from zero.  The rms error is a miniscule 7 bps and the p-value is 34%.  Liquidity is fairly 
successful in explaining the slopes of returns across moneyness, not just the level.  Specifically, 
the ITM-OTM difference in put returns decreases from 69 bps to 48 bps when the premium is 
estimated from the universe of equities; and to 12 bps when the premium is estimated from the 
universe of options. 
Bid-Ask shares some of the positive attributes of Liquidity.  The Bid-Ask betas of the 
calls are statistically different from zero but the betas of the puts are not.  The premium estimated 
from the universe of equities is positive and insignificantly different from zero.  About half the 
alphas are statistically different from zero.  The rms error is 39 bps, compared to the rms error of 
47 bps obtained from the single-factor model with the S&P 500 index as the only factor.   
However, the p-value is 0%.  Furthermore, the Bid-Ask premium estimated from the universe of 
options is almost ten times as high and not significantly different from zero.  Also, Bid-Ask does 
a poor job in explaining the cross-section of put returns: the OTM put alpha is significantly 
positive and the ITM put alpha is significantly negative.  The difference between the alphas of 
the ITM and OTM puts is large at -45 bps (s.e. 13 bps).  Even though the rms error is low at 13 
bps, the p-value is zero. 
The remaining three factors (Volume, Open Interest, and OTM Put Volume) have very 
different premia estimated from the universe of equities versus the universe of options.   
Furthermore, they do not improve upon the single factor model when the premium is estimated 
from the universe of equities.  We conclude that these factors do not work well across the equity 
and option markets. 25 
 
Recall that amongst the six option-based factors, Volatility Jump and Jump are the only 
two factors that work reasonably well in explaining the cross-section of option returns, even 
when we impose the stricter standard of estimating the premium from the universe of equities 
and that these factors are highly correlated with Liquidity.  The results in this section are 
consistent with the interpretation that the three crisis-related factors, Volatility Jump, Jump, and 
Liquidity, operate across the equity and option markets. 
 
V.5  Pricing with factors based on sentiment and retail option demand 
We consider four factors that reflect sentiment and noise-trader demand, defined in Appendix B: 
the sentiment factor proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2007), “Sentiment”; the change in the 
precision (cross-sectional standard error) of one-quarter-ahead GDP growth forecasts from the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, “SPF Dispersion”; the 
difference in net demand (in number of contracts) by small and medium size investors according 
to Market Data Express, “Retail Call Demand” and “Retail Put Demand”.  We pair each factor 
with the S&P 500 index as the first factor.  The results are reported in Table XI. 
 
[Table XI about here] 
 
Retail Put Demand shows limited promise in explaining the cross-section of option 
returns.  The Retail Put Demand betas of the call portfolios and the difference in the betas of the 
ITM and OTM call portfolios are statistically different from zero.  Likewise, the Retail Put 
Demand betas of the OTM put portfolios and the difference in the betas of the ITM and OTM put 
portfolios are statistically different from zero.  However, the Retail Put Demand premia 
estimated from the universe of equities and the universe of options are not statistically different 
from zero.  The difference in the alphas of the OTM and ITM calls is statistically different from 
zero when the premium is estimated from the universe of options.  The difference in the alphas 
of the OTM and ITM puts is statistically different from zero irrespective of whether the premium 
is estimated from the universe of equities or options.  Retail Put Demand does not improve upon 
the single factor model when the premium is estimated from the universe of equities.  When the 
premium is estimated from the universe of options, the rms error drops to 10 bps but the p-value 
is zero. 26 
 
Retail Call Demand shows even more limited promise in explaining the cross-section of 
option returns.  Some Retail Call Demand betas of the call and put portfolios are statistically 
different from zero.  However, the Retail Call Demand premia estimated from the universe of 
equities and the universe of options are not statistically different from zero.  The difference in the 
alphas of the OTM and ITM calls is statistically different from zero when the premium is 
estimated from the universe of options.  The difference in the alphas of the OTM and ITM puts is 
statistically different from zero, irrespective of whether the premium is estimated from the 
universe of equities or options.  Retail Call Demand only marginally improves upon the single 
factor model when the premium is estimated from the universe of equities.  When the premium is 
estimated from the universe of options, the rms error drops to 15 bps but the p-value is zero. 
The remaining two factors, Sentiment and SPF Dispersion have insignificant betas and 
insignificant premia.  They fail to capture the spread in put portfolio returns, even when their 
premia are estimated from the universe of options.  Neither factor improves upon the single 
factor model when the premium is estimated from the universe of equities.  When the Sentiment 
premium is estimated from the universe of options, the rms error drops to 25 bps and the p-value 
is 65%.  When the SPF Dispersion premium is estimated from the universe of options, the rms 
error remains at 42 bps and the p-value is 2%.  We consider these results as spurious and dismiss 
these two factors in view of their insignificant betas and premia. 
 
V.6  Pricing with macro-based factors 
We consider six factors that either reflect macroeconomic conditions or have been suggested in 
the literature, defined in Appendix B: the monthly premium of the BAA bond return over the 
AAA bond return, “Default”; the monthly premium of the 10-year bond return over the 3-month 
T-Bill return, “Term”; the market Sharpe ratio, “Sharpe” from Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2004); 
the LIBOR rate, “Riskfree”; “Inflation”, also as in Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2004); and the 
return on a portfolio mimicking GDP growth, as in Vassalou (2003), “GDP”.  We pair each 
factor with the S&P 500 index as the first factor.  The results are reported in Table XII. 
 
[Table XII about here] 
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With few exceptions, the betas and premia are not significantly different from zero.  In all 
specifications, the pricing errors resulting from equity-based premia are large, ranging from 42 
bps for GDP to 56 bps for Riskfree.  These factors fail to reconcile the spread in put returns with 
the level of call returns.  When the premia are estimated from the universe of options, the rms 
error is low and the p-value is high.  We consider these results as spurious and dismiss these 
factors in view of their insignificant betas and premia. 
 
V.7 Robustness 
Here we check the robustness of our results for the main factors, namely, S&P 500, Jump, 
Volatility, Volatility Jump, Liquidity, and Bid-Ask.  First, we examine the sensitivity of our 
results to post-1996 data.  This has the additional advantage of allowing us to relate our tests to 
current research in option pricing which uses only the OptionMetrics database.  Table XIII 
differs from the select factor results in Tables VIII-X only in that we limit the sample to the 
subperiod covered by the OptionMetrics database, January 1996 to October 2009.  About 5% of 
the table entries change by more than two standard deviations from the main results where we 
use the standard deviations in the main tables.   
 
[Table XIII about here] 
 
Second, we suppress the effects of the 1987 crash and the 2007/2008 financial crisis by 
using as a sample only July 1988 to June 2007.  About 3% of the entries in Table XIII change by 
more than two standard deviations from the main results.   
Third, we use deciles for the stock portfolios instead of the 25 Fama-French portfolios.  
The premium on each factor is estimated from the cross-section of decile portfolios of CRSP 
equities sorted on the particular factor.  The pricing errors generally deteriorate slightly and in 
some cases almost double, compared to the case where the premia are estimated from the Fama-
French portfolios.  The decile portfolios by construction have a large spread in factor betas which 
generally results in smaller factor premia.  This in turn leads to larger pricing errors. Only about 
1% of the entries in Table VIII change by more than two standard deviations from the main 
results. 28 
 
Lastly, we eliminate all the filters on the raw data.  About 4% of the entries in Table XIII 
change by more than two standard deviations from the main results.  Overall, it emerges that our 
results are fairly stable when we define changes as point estimates more than two standard 
deviations away from the main results where we use the standard deviations in the main tables. 
 
 
VI. Concluding  Remarks 
 
In this paper, we establish that the leverage-adjusted returns on S&P 500 index options strongly 
reject the predictions of the Black-Scholes-Merton model.  Specifically, the leverage-adjusted 
returns of calls are low and decreasing in the strike price, whereas the leverage-adjusted returns 
of puts are high and also decreasing in the strike price.  As a potential explanation of this puzzle, 
we consider a range of unconditional factor pricing theories, where the factor premia are 
estimated either from the universe of equities or the universe of options. 
Of all the factors that we consider, the three crisis-related factors, Volatility Jump, Jump, 
and Liquidity, and, to a lesser extent, Bid-Ask, are the only ones that work reasonably well in 
explaining the cross-section of index option returns, even when we impose the restriction that the 
premia are estimated from the universe of equities.  Among these, Volatility Jump is the most 
promising factor, reducing the pricing errors of our option portfolios by 75% with a large and 
significant premium estimated among equities.  Furthermore, Volatility Jump reduces the pricing 
errors of the 25 Fama-French portfolios by more than Size and only a bit less than Value.  These 
findings are consistent with a picture that crisis-related factors operate across the equities and 
index options markets. 29 
 
Appendix A: Data and Methodology 
 
A.1 Data  sets 
The master Berkeley Option Database consists of intraday quotes on individual options and we 
seek to extract a single end-of-day cross section of quotes, comparable to the quotes provided by 
OptionMetrics in the latter part of our sample.  In addition, we seek to avoid the issue of non-
synchronous trading.  To that end, on each trading day, we find the minute between 3:00 PM and 
4:00 PM Central Standard Time with the largest number of simultaneous quotes.  We stop at 
4:00 PM because the market closes at 4:15 PM and we wish to avoid contamination relating to 
last minute trading activity.  We record all option quotes in that minute. 
Next we add not so far recorded quotes in the adjacent minutes within the same hour one 
after the other.  Here, we assume that the implied volatilities stay constant within that final hour 
of the day.  Based on this assumption, we create hypothetical option prices for the option in 
adjacent minutes.  About half of our observations from the Berkeley database are obtained from 
a single minute.  The pattern of returns across our portfolios remains unchanged if we use only 
the observations obtained from the single minute. 
We also record the intraday volume of each of our end-of-day options, as well as total 
daily call volume and total daily put volume.  We further collect the present value of all realized 
dividend payments during the remaining life of each option, discounting with the relevant 
constant maturity T-bill rate from the H.15 statistical release of the Federal Reserve.  We work 
out the associated continuously compounded dividend yield. 
The OptionMetrics database is already in the form of end-of-day quotes collected using a 
proprietary method similar to the one we outline for the Berkeley database.  OptionMetrics 
provides the dividend yield and open interest of each option. 
In Figure A1, we present the time series of the bid-ask spreads of calls and puts.  In Panel 
A, circles denote the bid-ask spreads at the beginning of each month and the solid lines denote 
the time-averaged spreads over the previous 12 months for the ITM call portfolio (K/S=0.95), the 
near-the-money call portfolio (K/S=1.00), and the OTM call portfolio (K/S=1.05).  In Panel B, 
we present the corresponding spreads for the OTM (K/S=0.95), near-the-money (K/S=1.00), and 
ITM (K/S=1.05) put portfolios.  Panels C and D present the spreads as a percentage of the 
average bid and ask prices.  In November 6, 1997 the CBOE increased the maximum allowable 30 
 
bid-ask spreads quoted by its members by as much as a factor of three in some instances.  This is 
reflected in the sharp increase in spreads (Panels A and B) at the end of 1997 but not in the 
percentage spreads (Panels C and D) because of an increase in option prices at about the same 
time. 
 
[Figure A1 about here] 
 
A.2 Filters 
We apply three levels of filters designed to minimize possible quoting errors.  In constructing our 
portfolios, we apply these filters on the trade-in (buy) side to make sure that we are buying into 
reliable quotes.  Applying our filters on the buy side minimizes the problem of having to make 
up trade-out prices for options that were bought but cannot be sold due to missing observations.  
When we seek to exit our position, if no quote is available in the filtered data, we look for a price 
in the raw data.  The filters are described below. 
 
Level 1 filters: 
“Identical” filter  The OptionMetrics data set contain duplicate observations, defined as two or 
more quotes with identical option type, strike, expiration date, and price.  In each such case, we 
eliminate all but one of the quotes. 
“Identical except price” filter  There are a few sets of quotes with identical terms (type, strike, 
and maturity) but different prices.  When this occurs, we keep the quote whose T-Bill-based 
implied volatility is closest to that of its moneyness neighbors, and delete the others. 
“Bid = 0” filter  We remove quotes of zero for bids thereby avoiding low valued options.  Also, a 
zero bid may indicate censoring as negative bids cannot be recorded. 
“Volume = 0” filter  We remove quotes on option contracts with zero volume during the day.  
Quotes for options that were not traded are less likely to be an accurate reflection of market 
conditions and suffer from illiquidity.  In addition, we want our results to apply to options that 
were actually traded by investors. 
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Level 2 filters: 
“Days to maturity <14 or >180” filter  We remove all options with fewer than 14 or more than 
180 calendar days to expiration.  The short maturity options tend to move erratically close to 
expiration and the long maturity options lack volume and open interest. 
 
“IV<5% or >100%” filter  We remove all option quotes with implied volatilities lower than 5% 
or higher than 100%, computed using T-Bill interest rates.  Such extreme values likely indicate 
quotation problems or simply low value. 
 
“Moneyness <0.8 or >1.2” filter  We remove all option quotes with moneyness, the ratio of strike 
price to index price, below 0.8 or above 1.2.  These options have little value beyond their 
intrinsic value and are also very thinly traded. 
 
“Implied interest rate <0” filter  When filtering outliers we use T-Bill interest rates to compute 
implied volatilities.  T-Bill interest rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve’s H.15 release.  
We assign a T-Bill rate to each observation by assuming that we can use the next shortest rate if 
the time to expiration of the option is shorter than the shortest constant maturity rate. 
Our goal is to obtain an interest rate that is as close as possible to the one faced by 
investors in the options market.  It appears that the T-Bill rates are not the relevant ones when 
pricing these options.  Specifically, when the T-Bill rates are used, put and call implied 
volatilities do not line up very well; for example the T-Bill rate tends to be too high for short 
maturity options, perhaps because no T-Bill has maturity of less than a month.  To address these 
issues, we compute a put-call-parity-implied interest rate.  Since we believe that put-call parity 
holds reasonably well in this deep and liquid European options market, we use the put-call-parity 
implied interest rate as our interest rate in the remainder of the paper and for further filters. 
To construct this rate, we take all put-call pairs of a given maturity and impose put-call 
parity using the bid-ask midpoint as the price, and allowing the interest rate to adjust.  We 
remove 14,200 pairs with a negative implied interest rate.  We then take the median implied 
interest rate across all remaining pairs of the same maturity with moneyness between 0.95 and 
1.05 and assign it to all quotes with that maturity.  We are able to directly assign an implied 
interest rate to 93% of our sample in this way.  We fill in the gaps by interpolating across 32 
 
maturities and if necessary, across days.  Our implied interest rate is on average 45 basis points 
below the T-Bill rate. 
 
“Unable to compute IV” filter  We remove quotes that imply negative time value. 
 
Level 3 filters: 
“IV” filter  We remove implied volatility outliers to reduce the prevalence of apparent butterfly 
arbitrage.  For each date and maturity, we fit a quadratic curve (separately to puts and calls) 
through the observed log implied volatilities.  We calibrate a confidence band around all curves 
using the entire sample.  Combining the information from all days and maturities in the sample, 
we compute a typical (one standard deviation) relative distance in percent from the level of the 
fitted curve for different levels of moneyness (0.8, 0.85, …, 1.2).  Thus, for each fitted IV curve, 
we compute the relative distance of all option IVs from the fitted IV curve and we calculate the 
standard deviation of these relative distances for each moneyness bin.  In a second pass, we 
check for each option’s IV, how many standard deviations it is apart from the fitted IV curve.  
These distances are tight in and around the money (about 2%) and wide in the out of the money 
range (around 3.5%). 
 
“Put-call parity” filter  For every put-call pair with the same date, maturity, and moneyness, we 
insure that put-call parity holds and that violations are eliminated.  Thus, for each put-call pair, 
we find the bid-ask midpoint put-call-parity implied interest rate.  Next, we trim outliers in a 
similar way as with the IV filter.  Specifically, we use the whole sample of distances of the put-
call parity implied interest rates from the corresponding daily median implied interest rate to find 
the standard deviation of the corresponding distances.  This distance is computed to be about 90 
basis points. 
We record the number of observations at each filtering level in Table A1.  Before the 
application of the filters, the Berkeley database consists of 269,461 observations and the 
OptionMetrics database consists of 3,711,535 observations.  Level 1 filters eliminate 76% of the 
prices from the OptionMetrics database but only 55% from the Berkeley database.  Level 2 
filters eliminate about 10% of the prices from each database and level 3 filters eliminate 4% and 
2%, respectively.  We also note that our filters produce 124 trading days with no surviving 33 
 
observations.  These dropped days represent 2% of the trading days in our sample and since they 
are determined without the use of forward-looking information, we safely do not rebalance our 
portfolios during those days. 
 
[Table A1 about here] 
 
Next, we compute implied volatilities based on the put-call parity implied interest rate, 
and 95% of these are within 1.4% of the T-Bill implied volatilities.  In the remainder of the 
paper, we work exclusively with these implied volatilities. 
 
A.3 Portfolio  formation 
We form 10 portfolios, five made up of calls and five made up of puts, each with targeted time to 
maturity 45 days and targeted moneyness 0.95, 0.98, 1, 1.02, and 1.05, where moneyness is the 
ratio of strike price to index price.  Specifically, at each date t, we use a bivariate Gaussian 
weighting kernel in moneyness and days to maturity to calculate weights for each portfolio.  The 
weighting kernel has bandwidths of 15 days to maturity and 0.02 in moneyness, although 
alternative settings make little difference.  We remove options whose portfolio weights are less 
than 1% from the portfolio to reduce the effect of outliers on our targeted portfolios.  The 
weights are normalized to sum to one. 
We record an error measure meant to capture the average distance between each option 
and the portfolio target.  Specifically, we define the distance between option i and portfolio 
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where  / K S h  and  DTM h  are the moneyness and maturity bandwidths of the weighting kernel.  To 
get a portfolio-level error measure, we average these distances over all options for each target 
portfolio, where the averaging is done using the same Gaussian weights as in forming the 
portfolio.  The average error measures are typically low near the money and increase towards the 
end of the moneyness range.  We also note that the error measures are on average lower in the 
OptionMetrics part of the sample than in the Berkeley data. 34 
 
For each option in a portfolio, we look for a quote on day t+1, including quotes from the 
unfiltered data in our search.  If a quote is found, the quoted price is used to compute a return for 
the option.  If not, we check if the option is about to expire in which case we use its expiration 
payoff to calculate a return.  If expiry is not imminent, we hold the option in the portfolio until it 
reappears, or until the end of the month, whichever comes first.  If the option fails to reappear by 
the end of the month, we compute an interpolated price by fitting an implied volatility surface 
that is quadratic in maturity and moneyness to the log implied volatilities of the available filtered 
options and use the fitted implied volatility to deduce a price for the missing option.  When 
holding on to an option in a portfolio because of a missing quote, we record a daily return of one 
and adjust its weight to account for the returns on the remaining options.  Whenever the option 
reappears, is exercised, or its price is interpolated, we compute a cumulative return and use the 
rebalanced weight to calculate the resulting portfolio return.  In this way, options that go missing 
and reappear before the end of the month do not introduce an error. 
When forming the portfolios, 96.6% of options bought are found and sold by the end of 
the month, 3.4% are sold using an interpolated price, and a negligible number expire while in the 
portfolio.  The interpolated options are found almost exclusively within the Berkeley database, 
where they make up as much as 15% of calls and 16% of puts. 
In testing our hypothesis  0 H , we construct leverage-adjusted portfolios.  Rather than 
investing one dollar in the option, we invest
1
BSM ω
−  dollars in the option and 
1 1 BSM ω
− −  dollars in the 
risk free rate, where  BSM ω  is the BSM elasticity based on the implied volatility of the option.  
The BSM elasticity is ( ) ( ) // BSM BSM CS S C ∂∂ ×  for a call and ( )( ) // BSM BSM PS S P ∂∂ ×  for a put.  
Note that the elasticity of a call is greater than one.  Therefore, a leverage-adjusted call option 
consists of a portfolio with investment in a fraction of a call and investment in the risk free rate.  
The elasticity of a put is negative and less than minus one.  Therefore, a leverage-adjusted put 
option consists of portfolio with a short position in fraction of a put and more than 100% 
investment in the risk free rate. 
In the next step, we combine the leverage-adjusted option returns into portfolio returns 
using their weights.  Finally, we compound the daily returns into monthly returns. 35 
 
Appendix B: Description of the Factors 
 
Market proxies 
S&P: monthly return of the S&P 500 index in excess of the return of the one-month T-Bill. 





Size: monthly return on the Fama and French size factor (SMB).  Source: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french 
Value: monthly return on the Fama and French value factor (HML).  Source: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french 
Momentum: momentum factor, the excess return on a portfolio long stocks with high returns 
over the period from 12 to two months before portfolio formation and short stocks with 





Jump: lowest daily return of the S&P 500 during the month, if lower than -4%, zero otherwise; 
approximately 7% of the months have nonzero Jump. 
Volatility: end-of-the-month ATM call portfolio implied volatility minus the beginning-of-the-
month ATM call portfolio implied volatility.  Using the CBOE-provided shorter time-
series VIX does significantly change the results. 
Volatility Jump: highest daily increase of the ATM call portfolio implied volatility during the 
month, if greater than 4%, zero otherwise; approximately 10% of the months have 
nonzero Volatility Jump. 
RV: annualized realized daily volatility over the month minus the realized volatility over the 
previous month. 
RV-IV: change over last month in the difference between the annualized realized volatility 
during the month and the annualized monthly ATM implied volatility at the beginning of 
the month. 
Slope: change over last month in the difference between the average of the OTM call and ITM 
put portfolio implied volatility and the average of the ITM call and OTM put portfolio 
implied volatility.  Using the CBOE-provided shorter time-series SKEW does 
significantly change the results. 
 
 




Liquidity: innovation of market-wide liquidity factor proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).  
Source: Wharton Research Data Services. 
Volume: percentage change in the monthly option volume. 
Open Interest: percentage change in the beginning of the month total option open interest, 
available only since 1996. 
OTM Put Volume: percentage change in the monthly 0.95 OTM put option volume. 
Bid-Ask: percentage change in the weighted average percentage bid-ask spread of the ATM call 
portfolio. 
 
Factors based on sentiment and noise-trader beliefs 
 
Sentiment: sentiment factor proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2007). 
SPF Dispersion: measure based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  Largely following Shaliastovich (2008), we take the 
cross-sectional dispersion of one-quarter-ahead nominal GDP growth forecasts and scale 
by the square-root of the number of forecasts to get a measure of the precision of the 
forecasts.  We then difference the series to obtain an innovation in forecast dispersion.  
We apply the corresponding quarterly observation to each month in the quarter. 
Retail Call Demand: monthly difference in net call demand (in number of contracts) by small 
and medium size investors, as classified and provided by Market Data Express. 
Retail Put Demand: monthly difference in net put demand (in number of contracts) by small 
and medium size investors, as classified and provided by Market Data Express. 
 
Macro-based and other factors 
 
Default: monthly premium of the BAA bond return over the AAA bond return, differenced over 
time. 
Term: monthly premium of the 10-year bond return over the one-month T-Bill return, 
differenced over time. 
Sharpe: innovation in the market Sharpe ratio as in Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2004). 
Riskfree: change in the one-month LIBOR. 
Inflation: innovation in inflation as in Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2004). 
GDP: return on a portfolio mimicking GDP growth, as in Vassalou (2003). 
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Appendix C: Test Methodology of Factor Pricing Models 
 
Following Cochrane (2005), we run all stages of our regressions simultaneously in one GMM 
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 are factor loadings; and 
12 , ,...,
F N λλ λ λ ⎡⎤ ≡ ⎣⎦  is a vector of factor premia.  Note that we do not allow a free cross-sectional 
intercept.  This increases statistical power and avoids a common problem where economically 
small variations in betas are amplified by large estimated premia together with a large cross-
sectional intercept.  Paradoxically, such estimates imply a non-zero excess return on the risk-free 
asset. 
For the models where we obtain the factor premia from the universe of equities, we 
estimate the stock portfolio betas from the first two restrictions, the factor premia from the third 
restriction, and the option portfolio betas from the fourth and fifth restrictions.  Specifically, we 


































where  N I  is the  NN ×  identity matrix where  N  can be a product term such as  SF NN.  In this 
way, we force OLS estimates of the factor premia.
10,11  We also force OLS estimates of the factor 
betas.  We do this because the ICAPM states that expected returns are linear in betas and we 
want to avoid the possibility of deviating from betas to better fit the cross section.  In terms of 
the selection matrix L, our GMM estimator is the solution to the just-identified system of 
equations,  0 T Lg = . 
The last moment of the GMM criterion corresponds to the pricing errors of the option 
portfolios.  Since all parameters in that moment are estimated using the other moment 
restrictions (note that the last column of the selection matrix contains only zeros), the option 
pricing errors provide a set of  O N  additional over-identified restrictions for testing the model 
(there are also  SF NN −  over-identified restrictions from the stock portfolios). 
We apply GMM to this system, noting that the resulting standard errors take into account 
the covariances between the estimated parameters.  Our test is otherwise similar to two-stage 
OLS, except for the fact that the option portfolios are not used in the estimation of the factor 
premia. 
                                                 
10 To see why, write the third element of  0 T Lg = : ( )
'' 0
SS S
t ER ββ λ − = .  Distributing, we obtain the OLS 
restriction 
1 '' SS S S
t E R λβ β β
−
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , which imposes OLS estimates for lambda.  In the other restrictions, the 
identity matrices achieve the same because we have already multiplied by the factors Ft inside the criterion.  In other 
words, we could have also written the criterion ( )
' SS S
t R β λβ −  and then used an identity matrix in the selection 
matrix L. 
11 We do not iterate because we are not estimating efficient GMM.  We are applying the a priori view that betas 
should be OLS betas and lambdas should be OLS lambdas.  Efficient GMM here is problematic because some of the 
moments are collinear and because GMM distorts the betas to fit the cross-section.  However, the whole content of 
our asset pricing test is that expected returns are linear in betas where beta is defined as the ratio of covariance to 
variance, which is OLS. 39 
 
We report bootstrapped standard errors and test statistics in order to account for the small 
sample properties of our estimators.  We bootstrap our data by removing the estimated pricing 
errors from the returns on the test assets and re-estimating the model under the null of zero 
pricing errors by randomly sampling our data while preserving its cross-sectional structure. 
For our tests which require premia estimated from the universe of options, we use the 
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Table I.  Summary statistics on filters for the Berkeley (April 1986 to December 1995) and OptionMetrics (January 1996 to 
October 2009) databases.  Filters are applied on the buy side but relaxed on the sell side.  Found observations are those options 
with records on the day following the purchase day.  If the same option is bought and sold two days in a row, it will appear as 
being found twice.  Missing observations are those options that disappear on the day following the day on which they were 
purchased.  If an option remains missing for two days, it is counted as missing twice.  Expired observations are options that 
expire while being held as missing in the portfolio.  Expired options are assigned their exercise value.  Missing options are held 
until found, or their implied volatility is interpolated at the end of the month using a fit quadratic in moneyness and linear in 
maturity and the interaction between moneyness and maturity. 
 
   Calls     Puts 
Observations Berkeley  OptionMetrics      Berkeley  OptionMetrics 
All trading days 
Found 24,989 86% 97,571 100%  29,383 85% 102,624 100%
Missing 4,111 14% 113 0%  5,014 15% 30 0%
Expired 43 0% 3 0%  25 0% 1 0%
Last trading day of the month 
Found 1,445 85% 4,868 99%  1,669 84% 5,078 100%
Interpolated 260 15% 28 1%      310 16% 11 0%
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Table II.  Summary statistics on the leverage-adjusted portfolios for the Berkeley (April 1986 to December 1995) and OptionMetrics (January 
1996 to October 2009) databases and tests of the Black-Scholes-Merton model. 
   Calls       Puts 
K/S 0.95  0.98 1 1.02 1.05 OTM-
ITM  0.95 0.98 1 1.02 1.05 ITM-
OTM
   Average returns 
Full sample 
0.32 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.17 -0.15 1.47 1.17 1.00 0.87 0.75 -0.72
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.08) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.09)
Berkeley 
0.74 0.62 0.56 0.49 0.41 -0.33 2.31 1.94 1.73 1.56 1.40 -0.91
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.12) (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.14)
Option-
Metrics 
0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.87 0.63 0.49 0.39 0.30 -0.58
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.11) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.12)
   Sample moments 
Sharpe -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.08 -0.46
St. Dev.  4.21  4.22 4.23 4.24 4.22 1.39 5.44 5.17 5.02 4.91 4.75 1.56
Skewness -0.18  -0.07 0.02 0.17 0.43 1.42 -1.24 -1.10 -1.04 -0.97 -0.85 1.27
Kurtosis 3.65  3.76 3.88 4.08 4.63 7.65 8.29 7.70 7.33 6.95 6.22 7.88
   Normality test 
J-B stat.  6  7 9 15 40 350 402 318 272 228 156 357
p-value 0.04  0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   S&P loadings 
Beta 0.86  0.85 0.84 0.82 0.77 -0.09 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Elasticity 15.96  21.03 25.56 31.73 41.74     -27.96 -25.81 -23.89 -21.87 -18.73  
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Table III.  Summary statistics on the leverage-adjusted portfolios for the Berkeley (April 1986 to December 1995) and OptionMetrics (January 
1996 to October 2009) databases and tests of the Black-Scholes-Merton model with unfiltered data. 
   Calls       Puts 
K/S 0.95  0.98 1 1.02 1.05 OTM-




0.34 0.26 0.21 0.17 0.13 -0.21 1.33 0.98 0.93 0.82 0.73 -0.61
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.08) (0.37) (0.36) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30) (0.13)
Berkeley 
0.82 0.66 0.57 0.48 0.37 -0.45 1.96 1.72 1.55 1.41 1.29 -0.66
(0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.12) (0.61) (0.53) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.25)
Option-
Metrics 
0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.89 0.47 0.49 0.40 0.32 -0.57
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.11) (0.46) (0.47) (0.42) (0.41) (0.39) (0.13)
   Sample moments 
Sharpe -0.00  -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 -0.28
St. Dev.  4.22  4.20 4.23 4.25 4.25 1.41 6.20 5.99 5.39 5.19 4.98 2.15
Skewness -0.24  -0.13 -0.04 0.12 0.43 1.29 -3.22 -2.60 -2.04 -1.79 -1.49 4.87
Kurtosis 3.81  3.84 3.95 4.17 4.83 7.22 27.40 18.35 15.23 13.09 10.83 48.99
   Normality test 
J-B stat.  11  9 11 17 48 288 7,512 3,096 1,961 1,350 826 26,059
p-value 0.01  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   S&P loadings 
Beta 0.87  0.85 0.85 0.83 0.79 -0.08 1.16 1.14 1.08 1.05 1.03 -0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Elasticity 13.79  19.07 24.33 31.29 42.23     -28.16 -25.97 -23.70 -21.01 -17.06  
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Table IV.  Summary statistics on the leverage-adjusted portfolios for the Berkeley (April 1986 to December 1995) and OptionMetrics (January 
1996 to October 2009) databases and tests of the Black-Scholes-Merton model.  The implied volatility of missing options at the end of the month 
is set to 2 percentage points lower than the interpolated value. 
   Calls        Puts 
K/S 0.95  0.98 1 1.02 1.05 OTM-
ITM    0.95 0.98 1 1.02 1.05 ITM-
OTM
   Average returns 
Full sample 
0.31 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.10 -0.21 1.52 1.21 1.03 0.89 0.76 -0.76
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.08) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.09)
Berkeley 
0.72 0.60 0.52 0.41 0.25 -0.47 2.44 2.02 1.78 1.60 1.42 -1.01
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.11) (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.14)
Option-
Metrics 
0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.88 0.63 0.49 0.39 0.30 -0.58
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.11) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.12)
   Sample moments 
Sharpe -0.01  -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.15 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.09 -0.48
St. Dev.  4.21  4.22 4.23 4.23 4.20 1.39 5.46 5.18 5.03 4.91 4.76 1.57
Skewness -0.18  -0.07 0.03 0.17 0.44 1.40 -1.24 -1.10 -1.03 -0.97 -0.84 1.25
Kurtosis 3.65  3.76 3.89 4.10 4.68 7.58 8.25 7.68 7.31 6.93 6.20 7.79
   Normality test 
J-B stat.  6  7 9 16 42 340 398 316 269 226 154 344
p-value 0.04  0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   S&P loadings 
Beta 0.86  0.85 0.84 0.82 0.77 -0.09 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Elasticity 15.96  21.03 25.56 31.73 41.74     -27.96 -25.81 -23.89 -21.87 -18.73  
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Table V.  Summary statistics on the leverage-adjusted portfolios for the Berkeley (April 1986 to December 1995) and OptionMetrics (January 
1996 to October 2009) databases and tests of the Black-Scholes-Merton model.  The implied volatility of missing options at the end of the month 
is set to 2 percentage points higher than the interpolated value. 
   Calls        Puts 
K/S 0.95  0.98 1 1.02 1.05 OTM-
ITM    0.95 0.98 1 1.02 1.05 ITM-
OTM
   Average returns 
Full sample 
0.32 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.26 -0.07 1.41 1.13 0.98 0.86 0.74 -0.66
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.08) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.09)
Berkeley 
0.75 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.62 -0.13 2.17 1.86 1.67 1.53 1.38 -0.79
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.13) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.14)
Option-
Metrics 
0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.87 0.62 0.48 0.39 0.29 -0.58
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.11) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.40) (0.12)
   Sample moments 
Sharpe -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 -0.43
St. Dev.  4.21  4.22 4.23 4.25 4.25 1.42 5.43 5.16 5.01 4.90 4.75 1.56
Skewness -0.18  -0.07 0.02 0.16 0.41 1.39 -1.23 -1.10 -1.04 -0.97 -0.85 1.25
Kurtosis 3.65  3.76 3.87 4.06 4.57 7.43 8.31 7.72 7.34 6.96 6.23 7.83
   Normality test 
J-B stat.  6  7 9 14 37 323 405 320 273 230 157 349
p-value 0.04  0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   S&P loadings 
Beta 0.86  0.85 0.84 0.82 0.77 -0.09 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Elasticity 15.96  21.03 25.56 31.73 41.74     -27.96 -25.81 -23.89 -21.87 -18.73  
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Table VI. Summary statistics on the leverage-adjusted portfolios for the Berkeley (July 1988 to December 1995) and OptionMetrics (January 
1996 to June 2007) databases and tests of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, excluding the October 1987 crash and the 2007-2009 crisis. 
   Calls        Puts 
K/S 0.95  0.98 1 1.02 1.05 OTM-
ITM    0.95 0.98 1 1.02 1.05 ITM-
OTM
   Average returns 
Full sample 
0.41 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.30 -0.11 1.61 1.28 1.10 0.97 0.85 -0.76
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.08) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.09)
Berkeley 
0.67 0.58 0.54 0.48 0.47 -0.20 2.34 1.92 1.68 1.50 1.32 -1.01
(0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.12) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.14)
Option-
Metrics 
0.24 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 -0.05 1.13 0.86 0.72 0.62 0.54 -0.60
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.12) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.12)
   Sample moments 
Sharpe 0.01  -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.12 -0.55
St. Dev.  3.85  3.86 3.88 3.90 3.90 1.28 4.40 4.20 4.11 4.05 3.97 1.39
Skewness -0.10  -0.01 0.08 0.25 0.60 1.55 -0.96 -0.79 -0.72 -0.66 -0.54 1.34
Kurtosis 3.43  3.42 3.50 3.69 4.46 7.51 5.86 5.35 5.06 4.87 4.42 7.26
   Normality test 
J - B  s t a t .   2   2 3 73 4 2 8 5 1 1 37 66 04 93 0 2 4 0
p-value 0.29  0.39 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   S&P loadings 
Beta 0.92  0.92 0.91 0.89 0.84 -0.08 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Elasticity 16.51  22.07 27.10 33.93 44.76    -29.36 -27.34 -25.33 -23.16 -19.75  
  50 
 
Table VII.  Summary statistics on the leverage-unadjusted portfolios for the Berkeley (April 1986 to December 1995) and OptionMetrics 
(January 1996 to October 2009) databases. 
   Calls        Puts 
K/S 0.95  0.98 1 1.02 1.05 OTM-
ITM    0.95 0.98 1 1.02 1.05 ITM-
OTM
   Average returns 
Full sample 
-2.18 -2.69 -0.82 3.51 14.18 16.36 -34.07 -26.97 -22.34 -18.00 -12.95 21.12
(3.98) (5.51) (7.72) (11.22) (17.99) (15.26) (6.70) (5.75) (5.14) (4.60) (3.94) (4.01)
Berkeley 
9.82 14.00 22.93 36.80 63.55 53.72 -36.06 -28.94 -24.93 -21.47 -16.72 19.34
(7.78) (11.14) (16.57) (24.94) (40.74) (35.13) (13.65) (11.26) (9.64) (8.16) (6.75) (9.02)
Option-
Metrics 
-10.64 -14.46 -17.56 -19.96 -20.62 -9.98 -32.67 -25.58 -20.51 -15.55 -10.29 22.38
(3.89) (4.98) (5.80) (7.12) (10.15) (7.57) (6.20) (5.78) (5.55) (5.35) (4.75) (2.54)
   Sample moments 
Sharpe -0.04  -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.31 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.20 0.31
St. Dev.  66.98  92.64 129.95 188.80 302.69 256.78 112.73 96.72 86.43 77.45 66.34 67.40
Skewness 2.39  3.65 5.37 6.55 7.11 7.86 7.44 5.54 4.42 3.33 2.40 -11.34
Kurtosis 13.61  25.04 43.77 56.82 59.73 69.74 81.93 50.58 34.77 20.80 11.42 160.89
   Normality test 
J-B stat.  1,597  6,359 20,960 36,182 40,337 55,437 76,080 28,138 12,823 4,260 1,106 300,006
p-value 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   S&P loadings 
Beta 11.42  14.34 17.48 21.89 29.46 18.03 -17.60 -16.53 -15.51 -14.45 -12.57 5.03
(0.56) (0.87) (1.36) (2.12) (3.58) (3.21) (1.05) (0.81) (0.66) (0.55) (0.45) (0.84)
Elasticity 15.96  21.03 25.58 31.85 42.05     -28.00 -25.81 -23.88 -21.86 -18.73  
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Table VIII.  Asset pricing tests with factors related to the cross section of equities, April 1986 to October 2009.  The factors are described in 
Appendix B.  The stock-based results estimate the factor premia among the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios.  The option-
based results use premia estimated among the 10 option portfolios themselves.  We report the betas (factor loadings) and pricing errors (alphas) 
for six of the 10 test portfolios (the results for the other four portfolios fall in between the reported ones).  The pricing test uses GMM with a 
selection matrix that forces OLS estimates as described in the paper.  We report bootstrapped standard errors and a bootstrapped p-value for the 
GMM J-statistic, both of which are based on 10,000 simulations.  The reported betas are for the second factor in all cases except in the first two 
specifications (S&P only and Market only,) where the reported betas are for the first and only factor. 
 
   Factor premia 
1
st factor  S&P  Market  S&P  S&P  S&P 
Stock-based 0.58 (0.31) 0.55 (0.30) 0.66 (0.29) 0.58 (0.32) 0.54 (0.31)
Option-based 0.36 (0.29) 0.38 (0.29) 0.27 (0.31) 0.78 (0.40) 2.79 (0.85)
Difference 0.22 (0.17) 0.17 (0.17) 0.38 (0.21) -0.19 (0.33) -2.24 (0.84)
2
nd factor  Size  Value  Momentum 
Stock-based -0.09 (0.21) 0.27 (0.24) -1.70 (1.13)
Option-based 3.27 (1.45) -51.51 (7.79) 44.14 (12.96)
Difference        -3.36 (1.39) 51.78 (7.77) -45.84 (13.01)
 
 
   Call portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor*) 
5% ITM  0.86 (0.04) 0.82 (0.04) -0.07 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) -0.05 (0.03)
ATM 0.84 (0.05) 0.79 (0.05) -0.11 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) -0.04 (0.03)
5% OTM  0.77 (0.06) 0.71 (0.06) -0.16 (0.05) 0.00 (0.06) -0.05 (0.03)
OTM-ITM -0.09 (0.03) -0.10 (0.02) -0.10 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.53 (0.18) -0.49 (0.17) -0.61 (0.15) -0.54 (0.19) -0.57 (0.18)
ATM -0.62 (0.19) -0.57 (0.18) -0.70 (0.16) -0.63 (0.20) -0.66 (0.19)52 
 
5% OTM  -0.63 (0.21) -0.58 (0.20) -0.71 (0.19) -0.63 (0.22) -0.68 (0.21)
OTM-ITM -0.10 (0.07) -0.09 (0.08) -0.10 (0.07) -0.09 (0.07) -0.11 (0.08)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.34 (0.08) -0.35 (0.08) -0.05 (0.04) -0.11 (0.08) -0.36 (0.08)
ATM -0.44 (0.10) -0.44 (0.10) -0.02 (0.02) -0.40 (0.06) -0.57 (0.09)
5% OTM  -0.46 (0.13) -0.46 (0.14) 0.14 (0.06) -0.57 (0.12) -0.02 (0.15)
OTM-ITM -0.12 (0.08) -0.11 (0.08) 0.19 (0.10) -0.47 (0.16) 0.34 (0.17)
   Put portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor*) 
5% OTM  1.02 (0.06) 1.01 (0.06) 0.20 (0.06) 0.00 (0.06) -0.05 (0.04)
ATM 0.99 (0.05) 0.98 (0.05) 0.13 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) -0.05 (0.03)
5% ITM  0.96 (0.04) 0.94 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) -0.05 (0.03)
ITM-OTM -0.05 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03) -0.12 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.53 (0.21) 0.56 (0.20) 0.48 (0.20) 0.53 (0.21) 0.49 (0.21)
ATM 0.07 (0.18) 0.11 (0.18) 0.01 (0.16) 0.07 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18)
5% ITM  -0.16 (0.17) -0.12 (0.16) -0.22 (0.15) -0.16 (0.18) -0.20 (0.17)
ITM-OTM -0.69 (0.10) -0.68 (0.10) -0.70 (0.10) -0.69 (0.10) -0.69 (0.10)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.75 (0.13) 0.73 (0.13) 0.19 (0.05) 0.41 (0.10) 0.53 (0.11)
ATM 0.29 (0.08) 0.28 (0.08) -0.05 (0.02) 0.14 (0.05) 0.27 (0.06)
5% ITM  0.06 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) -0.12 (0.03) 0.36 (0.07) 0.13 (0.06)
ITM-OTM -0.70 (0.10) -0.69 (0.10) -0.32 (0.08) -0.05 (0.14) -0.40 (0.13)
   Stock portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.27 (0.00) 0.28 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00) 0.20 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.47 (0.00) 0.44 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 0.47 (0.00) 0.49 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using option-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.42 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.37 (0.96) 0.39 (0.90)
  53 
 
Table IX.  Asset pricing tests with volatility-related factors, April 1986 to October 2009.  The factors are described in Appendix B.  The stock-
based results estimate the factor premia among the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios.  The option-based results use premia 
estimated among the 10 option portfolios themselves.  We report the betas (factor loadings) and pricing errors (alphas) for six of the 10 test 
portfolios (the results for the other four portfolios fall in between the reported ones).  The pricing test uses GMM with a selection matrix that 
forces OLS estimates as described in the paper.  We report bootstrapped standard errors and a bootstrapped p-value for the GMM J-statistic, both 
of which are based on 10,000 simulations. 
 
   Factor premia 
1
st factor  S&P  S&P  S&P  S&P  S&P  S&P 
Stock-based 0.49  (0.30) 0.62 (0.29) 0.36 (0.30)  0.59 (0.28) 0.61 (0.29) 0.61 (0.31)
Option-based 0.67  (0.91) 0.19 (0.29) 0.28 (0.32)  0.34 (0.29) 0.32 (0.30) 0.30 (0.42)
Difference -0.19  (0.90) 0.43 (0.15) 0.08 (0.21)  0.25 (0.19) 0.28 (0.21) 0.31 (0.37)
2
nd factor  Jump  Volatility  Volatility Jump  RV  RV-IV  Slope 
Stock-based 0.55  (0.45) -0.10 (0.80) -0.88 (0.41)  -0.27 (1.57) -0.28 (2.05) 0.84 (0.56)
Option-based 1.84  (2.30) -1.26 (0.41) -1.07 (0.57)  -3.64 (1.18) 4.81 (1.55) -5.12 (3.03)
Difference -1.29  (2.32) 1.16 (0.79) 0.18 (0.69)  3.37 (1.82) -5.09 (2.40) 5.97 (3.09)
   Call portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% ITM  -0.34  (0.11) 0.13 (0.07) 0.23 (0.09)  0.09 (0.03) -0.07 (0.02) 0.03 (0.07)
ATM -0.40  (0.13) 0.24 (0.07) 0.35 (0.10)  0.12 (0.03) -0.09 (0.02) 0.05 (0.09)
5% OTM  -0.47  (0.16) 0.39 (0.09) 0.51 (0.13)  0.16 (0.04) -0.12 (0.03) 0.06 (0.10)
OTM-ITM -0.12  (0.10) 0.26 (0.04) 0.28 (0.06)  0.07 (0.03) -0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.06)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.30  (0.22) -0.59 (0.18) -0.16 (0.22)  -0.55 (0.21) -0.61 (0.20) -0.59 (0.19)
ATM -0.36  (0.25) -0.70 (0.24) -0.15 (0.26)  -0.65 (0.25) -0.71 (0.24) -0.69 (0.21)
5% OTM  -0.35  (0.29) -0.73 (0.34) -0.04 (0.33)  -0.65 (0.31) -0.73 (0.29) -0.70 (0.23)
OTM-ITM -0.05  (0.11) -0.14 (0.20) 0.12 (0.16)  -0.10 (0.12) -0.12 (0.12) -0.12 (0.09)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.03  (0.12) -0.05 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05)  -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.13 (0.15)
ATM -0.02  (0.11) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.03)  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.13 (0.15)54 
 
5% OTM  0.10  (0.16) 0.13 (0.05) 0.12 (0.06)  0.10 (0.04) 0.09 (0.05) -0.10 (0.20)
OTM-ITM 0.12  (0.19) 0.17 (0.08) 0.16 (0.11)  0.11 (0.07) 0.10 (0.08) 0.03 (0.21)
   Put portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% OTM  0.19  (0.35) -0.63 (0.12) -0.65 (0.17)  -0.18 (0.06) 0.14 (0.05) -0.16 (0.25)
ATM 0.01  (0.28) -0.44 (0.11) -0.40 (0.13)  -0.10 (0.05) 0.08 (0.04) -0.06 (0.16)
5% ITM  -0.11  (0.24) -0.29 (0.10) -0.24 (0.10)  -0.06 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.12)
ITM-OTM -0.30  (0.13) 0.35 (0.05) 0.41 (0.09)  0.12 (0.02) -0.10 (0.02) 0.20 (0.14)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.53  (0.30) 0.63 (0.48) 0.21 (0.35)  0.54 (0.30) 0.57 (0.32) 0.64 (0.28)
ATM 0.16  (0.24) 0.13 (0.35) -0.04 (0.25)  0.08 (0.21) 0.08 (0.22) 0.09 (0.21)
5% ITM  -0.02  (0.22) -0.13 (0.25) -0.14 (0.19)  -0.16 (0.16) -0.18 (0.17) -0.22 (0.19)
ITM-OTM -0.55  (0.18) -0.76 (0.27) -0.36 (0.22)  -0.70 (0.20) -0.74 (0.21) -0.86 (0.17)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.10  (0.19) 0.19 (0.04) 0.17 (0.06)  0.17 (0.04) 0.14 (0.04) -0.02 (0.28)
ATM -0.04  (0.10) -0.05 (0.01) -0.04 (0.03)  -0.05 (0.01) -0.04 (0.02) 0.06 (0.12)
5% ITM  -0.06  (0.14) -0.11 (0.03) -0.11 (0.06)  -0.12 (0.03) -0.11 (0.03) 0.29 (0.21)
ITM-OTM -0.17  (0.28) -0.30 (0.06) -0.28 (0.11)  -0.29 (0.06) -0.25 (0.07) 0.32 (0.40)
   Stock portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.26  (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) 0.22 (0.00)  0.27 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) 0.24 (0.01)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.32  (0.02) 0.54 (0.00) 0.13 (0.01)  0.48 (0.00) 0.53 (0.00) 0.53 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using option-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.06  (0.16) 0.09 (0.00) 0.08 (0.02)  0.08 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.17 (0.75)55 
 
Table X.  Asset pricing tests with factors related to liquidity, April 1986 to October 2009.  The factors are described in Appendix B.  The stock-
based results estimate the factor premia among the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios.  The option-based results use premia 
estimated among the 10 option portfolios themselves.  We report the betas (factor loadings) and pricing errors (alphas) for six of the 10 test 
portfolios (the results for the other four portfolios fall in between the reported ones).  The pricing test uses GMM with a selection matrix that 
forces OLS estimates as described in the paper.  We report bootstrapped standard errors and a bootstrapped p-value for the GMM J-statistic, both 
of which are based on 10,000 simulations. 
Factor premia 
1
st factor  S&P Market  S&P  S&P  S&P 
Stock-based  0.33 (0.32) 0.66 (0.30) 0.44 (0.42) 0.59 (0.31) 0.53 (0.30)
Option-based  0.62 (0.93) 0.30 (0.31) -0.17 (0.61) 0.41 (0.37) 0.67 (0.64)
Difference  -0.29 (0.95) 0.36 (0.21) 0.61 (0.53) 0.18 (0.28) -0.14 (0.59)
2
nd factor  Liquidity  Volume  Open Interest  OTM Put Volume  Bid-Ask 
Stock-based  5.67 (2.18) 0.11 (0.10) -0.09 (0.09) 0.49 (0.22) 0.26 (0.44)
Option-based  14.92 (19.70) -0.40 (0.19) -0.97 (0.75) -0.79 (0.72) 2.12 (2.65)
Difference  -9.25 (19.74) 0.51 (0.20) 0.88 (0.75) 1.28 (0.75) -1.86 (2.65)
   Call portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% ITM  -0.03  (0.03) 0.63 (0.28) -0.04 (0.62) 0.36 (0.18) -0.25 (0.08)
ATM -0.04  (0.03) 0.93 (0.33) 0.16 (0.73) 0.55 (0.21) -0.32 (0.10)
5% OTM  -0.06  (0.03) 1.33 (0.45) 0.32 (0.96) 0.86 (0.30) -0.39 (0.12)
OTM-ITM -0.02  (0.02) 0.70 (0.29) 0.36 (0.51) 0.50 (0.17) -0.14 (0.06)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.16  (0.23) -0.67 (0.17) -0.67 (0.24) -0.71 (0.19) -0.42 (0.18)
ATM -0.19  (0.25) -0.79 (0.19) -0.68 (0.25) -0.89 (0.21) -0.49 (0.21)
5% OTM  -0.14  (0.28) -0.84 (0.22) -0.61 (0.29) -1.05 (0.26) -0.48 (0.24)
OTM-ITM 0.02  (0.11) -0.17 (0.10) 0.06 (0.11) -0.33 (0.14) -0.06 (0.09)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.10  (0.14) -0.04 (0.04) -0.17 (0.12) -0.10 (0.08) -0.07 (0.10)
ATM -0.02  (0.12) -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.10) -0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (0.06)
5% OTM  0.15  (0.19) 0.12 (0.06) 0.14 (0.17) 0.19 (0.09) 0.14 (0.12)
OTM-ITM 0.24  (0.25) 0.16 (0.10) 0.31 (0.21) 0.29 (0.14) 0.21 (0.19)56 
 
   Put portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% OTM  0.02  (0.06) -1.77 (0.68) -0.72 (1.19) -0.61 (0.34) 0.08 (0.15)
ATM 0.00  (0.05) -0.97 (0.49) -0.41 (0.95) -0.35 (0.26) 0.02 (0.12)
5% ITM  -0.02  (0.04) -0.56 (0.41) -0.11 (0.77) -0.20 (0.21) -0.03 (0.10)
ITM-OTM -0.04  (0.02) 1.21 (0.36) 0.60 (0.56) 0.41 (0.17) -0.11 (0.07)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.58  (0.31) 0.66 (0.27) 0.03 (0.29) 0.81 (0.28) 0.55 (0.21)
ATM 0.25  (0.27) 0.11 (0.20) -0.31 (0.25) 0.24 (0.23) 0.11 (0.18)
5% ITM  0.11  (0.25) -0.16 (0.18) -0.46 (0.23) -0.07 (0.20) -0.10 (0.17)
ITM-OTM -0.48  (0.15) -0.83 (0.15) -0.49 (0.13) -0.88 (0.13) -0.66 (0.11)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.09  (0.21) 0.12 (0.06) 0.08 (0.17) 0.22 (0.08) 0.27 (0.11)
ATM -0.02  (0.10) -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.08) -0.03 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05)
5% ITM  -0.03  (0.14) -0.10 (0.04) 0.06 (0.14) -0.15 (0.05) -0.17 (0.06)
ITM-OTM -0.12  (0.30) -0.22 (0.09) -0.02 (0.27) -0.37 (0.11) -0.45 (0.13)
   Stock portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.24 (0.02) 0.27 (0.03) 0.30 (0.10) 0.23 (0.39) 0.27 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.27 (0.03) 0.60 (0.00) 0.52 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00) 0.39 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using option-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.07  (0.34) 0.07 (0.04) 0.09 (0.21) 0.12 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00)
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Table XI.  Asset pricing tests with factors based on sentiment and noise-trader beliefs, April 1986 to October 2009.  The factors are described in 
Appendix B.  The stock-based results estimate the factor premia among the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios.  The option-based 
results use premia estimated among the 10 option portfolios themselves.  We report the betas (factor loadings) and pricing errors (alphas) for six of 
the 10 test portfolios (the results for the other four portfolios fall in between the reported ones).  The pricing test uses GMM with a selection 
matrix that forces OLS estimates as described in the paper.  We report bootstrapped standard errors and a bootstrapped p-value for the GMM J-
statistic, both of which are based on 10,000 simulations. 
   Factor premia 
1
st factor  S&P  Market  S&P  S&P 
Stock-based 0.84 (0.31) 0.58 (0.31) 0.58 (0.30) 0.74 (0.31)
Option-based 0.50 (0.73) 0.43 (0.30) 0.16 (0.35) 0.27 (0.30)
Difference 0.34 (0.74) 0.15 (0.23) 0.42 (0.28) 0.47 (0.20)
2
nd factor  Sentiment  SPF Dispersion  Retail Call Demand  Retail Put Demand 
Stock-based -0.05 (0.10) -2.15 (1.16) -0.12 (0.22) 0.24 (0.34)
Option-based -9.98 (5.70) 3.39 (2.67) -0.59 (0.49) -0.68 (0.54)
Difference 9.93 (5.70) -5.53 (2.89) 0.47 (0.52) 0.92 (0.60)
   Call portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% ITM  0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.04) 0.24 (0.28) 0.41 (0.16)
ATM 0.03 (0.12) -0.02 (0.04) 0.45 (0.32) 0.56 (0.19)
5% OTM  0.06 (0.15) -0.04 (0.05) 0.72 (0.39) 0.80 (0.26)
OTM-ITM 0.06 (0.08) -0.03 (0.03) 0.48 (0.16) 0.39 (0.14)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.65 (0.18) -0.56 (0.19) -0.58 (0.18) -0.87 (0.22)
ATM -0.74 (0.20) -0.67 (0.20) -0.61 (0.20) -0.96 (0.26)
5% OTM  -0.75 (0.21) -0.72 (0.23) -0.53 (0.25) -0.97 (0.33)
OTM-ITM -0.09 (0.08) -0.16 (0.10) 0.05 (0.12) -0.10 (0.14)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.35 (0.17) -0.37 (0.05) -0.09 (0.05) -0.06 (0.03)
ATM -0.11 (0.12) -0.43 (0.05) -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02)
5% OTM  0.12 (0.23) -0.38 (0.09) 0.15 (0.06) 0.16 (0.04)




   Put portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% OTM  -0.02 (0.20) -0.04 (0.07) -0.78 (0.33) -0.73 (0.31)
ATM -0.04 (0.15) -0.01 (0.05) -0.72 (0.25) -0.42 (0.24)
5% ITM  -0.02 (0.13) -0.01 (0.05) -0.52 (0.21) -0.20 (0.19)
ITM-OTM 0.00 (0.09) 0.03 (0.04) 0.26 (0.19) 0.54 (0.15)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.49 (0.19) 0.43 (0.24) 0.26 (0.25) 0.39 (0.30)
ATM 0.00 (0.16) 0.06 (0.20) -0.18 (0.22) -0.14 (0.22)
5% ITM  -0.23 (0.16) -0.18 (0.19) -0.38 (0.19) -0.42 (0.18)
ITM-OTM -0.72 (0.10) -0.61 (0.13) -0.64 (0.11) -0.81 (0.19)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.64 (0.24) 0.83 (0.10) 0.35 (0.11) 0.20 (0.05)
ATM -0.05 (0.12) 0.25 (0.05) -0.08 (0.03) -0.05 (0.02)
5% ITM  -0.10 (0.10) 0.02 (0.04) -0.19 (0.04) -0.13 (0.04)
ITM-OTM -0.74 (0.26) -0.81 (0.11) -0.54 (0.14) -0.34 (0.09)
   Stock portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.26 (0.00) 0.23 (0.02) 0.28 (0.00) 0.28 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.54 (0.00) 0.49 (0.00) 0.45 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using option-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.25 (0.65) 0.42 (0.02) 0.15 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00)
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Table XII.  Asset pricing tests with macro-based and other factors, April 1986 to October 2009.  The factors are described in Appendix B.  The 
stock-based results estimate the factor premia among the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios.  The option-based results use premia 
estimated among the 10 option portfolios themselves.  We report the betas (factor loadings) and pricing errors (alphas) for six of the 10 test 
portfolios (the results for the other four portfolios fall in between the reported ones).  The pricing test uses GMM with a selection matrix that 
forces OLS estimates as described in the paper.  We report bootstrapped standard errors and a bootstrapped p-value for the GMM J-statistic, both 
of which are based on 10,000 simulations. 
   Factor premia 
1
st  factor  S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Stock-based 0.59  (0.30) 0.59 (0.32) 0.84 (0.41) 0.63 (0.30) 0.81 (0.40) 0.55 (0.36)
Option-based 0.42  (0.81) 0.00 (0.67) 2.63 (1.30) 1.18 (0.91) 1.65 (0.97) 0.50 (0.41)
Difference 0.17  (0.77) 0.60 (0.65) -1.80 (1.31) -0.55 (0.90) -0.84 (0.95) 0.05 (0.38)
2
nd factor  Default  Term  Sharpe  Riskfree  Inflation  GDP 
Stock-based 0.00  (0.03) -0.19 (0.09) -0.08 (0.04) 0.18 (0.10) 0.15 (0.15) 0.09 (0.03)
Option-based -0.13  (0.26) -0.58 (1.07) -1.00 (0.56) -1.74 (1.41) -2.00 (1.24) 0.60 (0.47)
Difference 0.13  (0.26) 0.39 (1.07) 0.91 (0.56) 1.92 (1.41) 2.15 (1.25) -0.50 (0.47)
   Call portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% ITM  3.13  (1.45) 0.09 (0.48) 2.11 (1.09) 0.56 (0.35) 0.55 (0.38) -0.30 (0.34)
ATM 3.84  (1.65) 0.23 (0.52) 2.07 (1.35) 0.64 (0.44) 0.65 (0.42) -0.67 (0.39)
5% OTM  4.64  (1.76) 0.39 (0.63) 2.14 (2.03) 0.67 (0.62) 0.60 (0.58) -1.31 (0.51)
OTM-ITM 1.50  (0.74) 0.30 (0.36) 0.03 (1.46) 0.11 (0.36) 0.05 (0.42) -1.01 (0.28)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.55  (0.17) -0.53 (0.21) -0.28 (0.30) -0.68 (0.18) -0.52 (0.23) -0.37 (0.23)
ATM -0.65  (0.18) -0.59 (0.23) -0.37 (0.31) -0.78 (0.19) -0.62 (0.25) -0.44 (0.25)
5% OTM  -0.65  (0.21) -0.57 (0.25) -0.35 (0.34) -0.79 (0.21) -0.60 (0.28) -0.44 (0.27)
OTM-ITM -0.10  (0.08) -0.04 (0.10) -0.07 (0.12) -0.11 (0.08) -0.08 (0.12) -0.07 (0.08)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% ITM  0.00  (0.12) 0.02 (0.12) 0.04 (0.18) -0.08 (0.13) -0.08 (0.17) -0.18 (0.13)
ATM -0.01  (0.10) 0.00 (0.10) -0.07 (0.15) -0.01 (0.13) 0.03 (0.16) -0.07 (0.07)
5% OTM  0.07  (0.19) 0.04 (0.18) 0.11 (0.30) 0.08 (0.21) -0.01 (0.26) 0.26 (0.12)




   Put portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% OTM  -3.02  (3.67) -1.47 (1.29) 1.07 (2.54) 0.33 (1.00) 0.19 (1.01) 1.10 (0.59)
ATM -2.56  (3.05) -1.24 (1.07) 1.37 (1.84) 0.26 (0.80) 0.23 (0.72) 0.66 (0.43)
5% ITM  -1.60  (2.60) -1.04 (0.92) 1.31 (1.43) 0.29 (0.66) 0.19 (0.59) 0.35 (0.36)
ITM-OTM 1.42  (1.26) 0.43 (0.47) 0.25 (1.50) -0.03 (0.43) 0.00 (0.53) -0.75 (0.34)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.53  (0.22) 0.24 (0.28) 0.86 (0.29) 0.42 (0.23) 0.77 (0.28) 0.75 (0.21)
ATM 0.08  (0.19) -0.17 (0.24) 0.39 (0.26) -0.02 (0.20) 0.26 (0.23) 0.27 (0.20)
5% ITM  -0.16  (0.17) -0.36 (0.22) 0.15 (0.26) -0.26 (0.19) 0.03 (0.22) 0.04 (0.20)
ITM-OTM -0.69  (0.10) -0.61 (0.12) -0.72 (0.15) -0.68 (0.10) -0.74 (0.16) -0.71 (0.11)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.32  (0.17) 0.27 (0.16) 0.21 (0.28) 0.49 (0.23) 0.42 (0.25) 0.23 (0.13)
ATM -0.08  (0.09) -0.06 (0.08) 0.00 (0.14) -0.07 (0.11) 0.00 (0.13) -0.02 (0.07)
5% ITM  -0.20  (0.08) -0.20 (0.11) -0.28 (0.18) -0.22 (0.13) -0.31 (0.17) -0.10 (0.07)
ITM-OTM -0.52  (0.18) -0.47 (0.21) -0.49 (0.33) -0.71 (0.29) -0.73 (0.31) -0.33 (0.16)
   Stock portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.27  (0.00) 0.20 (0.12) 0.23 (0.04) 0.25 (0.05) 0.28 (0.03) 0.21 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.48  (0.00) 0.44 (0.00) 0.44 (0.00) 0.56 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using option-based premia) 
rms (p)  0.13  (0.01) 0.12 (0.01) 0.13 (0.96) 0.20 (0.42) 0.22 (0.74) 0.14 (0.03)
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Table XIII:  Asset pricing tests with selected factors for the OptionMetrics subsample, 1996-2009.  The factors are described in Appendix C.  
The stock-based results estimate the factor premia among the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios.  The option-based results use 
premia estimated among the 10 option portfolios themselves.  We report the betas (factor loadings) and pricing errors (alphas) for six of the 10 
test portfolios (the results for the other four portfolios fall in between the reported ones).  The pricing test uses GMM with a selection matrix that 
forces OLS estimates as described in the paper.  We report bootstrapped standard errors and a bootstrapped p-value for the GMM J-statistic, both 
of which are based on 10,000 simulations.  The sample period covers April 1986 through October 2009. 
   Factor premia 
1
st factor  S&P  S&P  S&P S&P S&P  S&P 
Stock-based  0.54 (0.43) 0.36 (0.43) 0.48 (0.40) 0.22 (0.42) 0.28 (0.42) 0.52 (0.40)
Option-based  0.02 (0.38) 0.16 (0.96) -0.11 (0.38) -0.03 (0.41) -0.06 (0.44) 0.25 (0.72)
Difference  0.52 (0.24) 0.19 (0.93) 0.59 (0.22) 0.24 (0.27) 0.34 (0.35) 0.28 (0.62)
2
nd factor  Jump Volatility  Volatility  Jump  Liquidity  Bid-Ask 
Stock-based  1.04 (0.51) -0.63 (0.88) -1.05 (0.49) 5.27 (2.75) 0.08 (0.56)
Option-based  1.14 (2.54) -0.65 (0.41) -0.65 (0.57) 5.85 (8.19) 1.44 (2.40)
Difference       -0.10 (2.56) 0.02 (0.83) -0.40 (0.75) -0.58 (8.56) -1.35 (2.43)
   Call portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% ITM  0.87  (0.05) -0.30 (0.14) 0.16 (0.10) 0.28 (0.12) 0.00 (0.02) -0.26 (0.11)
ATM 0.83  (0.06) -0.37 (0.17) 0.28 (0.11) 0.41 (0.13) 0.00 (0.02) -0.34 (0.12)
5% OTM  0.76  (0.07) -0.51 (0.22) 0.43 (0.14) 0.60 (0.15) -0.01 (0.03) -0.43 (0.15)
OTM-ITM -0.11  (0.03) -0.21 (0.14) 0.27 (0.05) 0.32 (0.07) -0.01 (0.02) -0.16 (0.07)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.73  (0.25) -0.28 (0.31) -0.62 (0.28) -0.17 (0.34) -0.56 (0.26) -0.69 (0.26)
ATM -0.76  (0.27) -0.25 (0.35) -0.61 (0.36) -0.08 (0.40) -0.57 (0.28) -0.71 (0.30)
5% OTM  -0.70  (0.30) -0.05 (0.44) -0.49 (0.47) 0.15 (0.50) -0.46 (0.32) -0.64 (0.35)
OTM-ITM 0.04  (0.10) 0.23 (0.19) 0.12 (0.24) 0.32 (0.22) 0.10 (0.13) 0.05 (0.13)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% ITM  -0.28  (0.10) -0.07 (0.12) -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.04) -0.27 (0.05) -0.09 (0.13)
ATM -0.33  (0.14) -0.04 (0.10) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.30 (0.05) -0.03 (0.08)
5% OTM  -0.30  (0.19) 0.16 (0.18) 0.12 (0.04) 0.13 (0.05) -0.21 (0.09) 0.14 (0.14)
OTM-ITM -0.02  (0.11) 0.23 (0.25) 0.16 (0.07) 0.18 (0.09) 0.06 (0.11) 0.24 (0.23)62 
 
   Put portfolios 
Betas (for 2
nd factor) 
5% OTM  1.12  (0.08) 0.22 (0.53) -0.74 (0.12) -0.67 (0.16) 0.00 (0.07) 0.04 (0.19)
ATM 1.07  (0.06) 0.06 (0.43) -0.53 (0.12) -0.44 (0.14) -0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.15)
5% ITM  1.03  (0.05) -0.05 (0.35) -0.35 (0.13) -0.25 (0.11) -0.01 (0.05) -0.06 (0.12)
ITM-OTM -0.09  (0.04) -0.26 (0.20) 0.39 (0.04) 0.42 (0.08) -0.01 (0.03) -0.09 (0.08)
Alphas (using stock-based premia) 
5% OTM  -0.02  (0.29) -0.02 (0.48) -0.20 (0.61) -0.32 (0.46) 0.10 (0.43) 0.00 (0.30)
ATM -0.38  (0.26) -0.24 (0.38) -0.49 (0.45) -0.46 (0.34) -0.21 (0.37) -0.36 (0.26)
5% ITM  -0.55  (0.24) -0.31 (0.33) -0.60 (0.33) -0.46 (0.27) -0.35 (0.33) -0.52 (0.24)
ITM-OTM -0.53  (0.13) -0.29 (0.24) -0.40 (0.33) -0.14 (0.29) -0.46 (0.17) -0.52 (0.13)
Alphas (using option-based premia) 
5% OTM  0.57  (0.16) 0.17 (0.15) 0.19 (0.04) 0.19 (0.05) 0.48 (0.08) 0.27 (0.10)
ATM 0.19  (0.11) -0.04 (0.08) -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.03) 0.15 (0.04) -0.05 (0.06)
5% ITM  -0.01  (0.06) -0.10 (0.11) -0.12 (0.03) -0.12 (0.05) 0.00 (0.05) -0.16 (0.06)
ITM-OTM -0.58  (0.12) -0.27 (0.20) -0.31 (0.06) -0.31 (0.10) -0.49 (0.11) -0.42 (0.11)
   Stock portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
R.m.s. (p)  0.31 (0.01) 0.27 (0.17) 0.31 (0.00) 0.21 (0.16) 0.29 (0.10) 0.31 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using stock-based premia) 
R.m.s. (p)  0.59 (0.00) 0.23 (0.03) 0.53 (0.00) 0.32 (0.01) 0.42 (0.00) 0.55 (0.00)
   Option portfolio test statistics (using option-based premia) 
R.m.s. (p)  0.31  (0.00) 0.09 (0.02) 0.09 (0.00) 0.09 (0.01) 0.27 (0.00) 0.12 (0.00)
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Table A1: Filters.  Number of observations that are removed by the filters.  The sample covers the Berkeley (April 1986 to December 1995), 
OptionMetrics (January 1996 to October 2009) and combined databases. 
Berkeley OptionMetrics  Total 
         Deleted  Remaining     Deleted  Remaining     Deleted  Remaining 
Starting 
Calls 143,261  1,719,755 1,863,016
Puts        126,199       1,722,319     1,848,518
All        269,461        3,442,074       3,711,535
Level 1 filters 
Identical     0       1,132,640       1,132,640   
Identical except price  0 191 191
Bid = 0  0 165,765 165,765
Volume = 0     148,790       1,376,333       1,525,123   
All        120,671        767,145       887,816
Level 2 filters 
Days to maturity < 14 or > 180  24,035 249,291 273,326
IV < 5% or > 100%  7 681 688
Moneyness < 0.8 or > 1.2  1,465 59,026 60,491
Implied interest rate < 0  542 27,792 28,334
Unable to compute IV     1,103       3,254       4,357   
All        93,519        427,100       520,619
Implied interest rate 
Directly assigned        84,988        412,376       497,364
Interpolated        8,531        14,724       23,255
All        93,519        427,100       520,619
Level 3 filters 
IV filter     4,313       26,207       30,520   
Put-call parity filter     5,576       21,642       27,218   
All        83,630        379,251       462,881
Final 
Calls        35,532        168,183       203,715
Puts        48,098        211,068       259,166
All        83,630        379,251       462,881
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Figure A1.  Level and percentage bid-ask spreads of the K/S=0.95, K/S=1.00 and K/S=1.05 call and put portfolios.  Panels A and C (B and D) 
report the bid-ask spreads for our call (put) portfolios.  Panels A and B report dollar bid-ask spreads, panels C and D report bid-ask spreads as a 














Panel A: Call portfolio dollar bid-ask spreads 
 
Panel B: Put portfolio dollar bid-ask spreads 
 
Panel C: Call portfolio relative bid-ask spreads 
 
Panel D: Call portfolio relative bid-ask spreads 
 